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With gun in hand, a distraught woman stood next to the bed
where her husband of many years lay peacefully sleeping. She leveled
the gun to his head, and fired repeatedly, killing him instantly. This
time he would not awaken to carry out his threats of sexual torture
and beatings. I
"Murder," said the prosecutor. "Justified," said feminist groups.
"Not guilty," said the jury. "A Right to Kill ' 2 and "When is Murder
Justified?' 3 asked the media. The confusion indicated by the head-
lines has also swept the legal profession, as battered women 4 have
* LL.M., Columbia University, 1984: Jervey Fellow. 1983-1985, Parker School of For-
eign and Comparative Law; Juris Doctorate, Capital University, 1979; currently working on a
doctorate degree at Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt, West Germany. My
thanks to Professor George Fletcher for his comments on an earlier draft of this article, and to
Professor Winfried Hassemer and Dimitrious Pitsounis for their helpful critique and support.
1. A jury acquitted Deborah Davis who shot her sleeping husband after he told her he
was going to sexually abuse and torture her (as he had done in the past) when he awoke.
Kansas City Times, July 3, 1980, at A-1, col. 2, as reported in Creach, Partially Determined
Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered Wife Kills and Tells Why, 34 STAN. L. REV. 615, 626
(1981-82) [hereinafter Creach].
2. The Right to Kill, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1975, at 69.
3. A Case for Women Who Kill Their Abusers: When is Murder Justified?, THE SEATTLE
WEEKLY, Apr. 11, 1984, at 30. [hereinafter When is Murder Justified?].
4. Battered and sexually abused children often find themselves in a no way out situation
with violent parents and some have resorted to killing to survive. The 1982 Wyoming case of
Richard and Deborah Janke dramatically brought the problem of child abuse to the attention
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taken their struggle into the courtrooms and demanded that the sys-
tem that failed to protect them5 from the violence of their mates 6 now
validate their personal defensive actions. The "reasonable man" is
being elbowed out as women compellingly challenge the sexist as-
sumptions, social structures and mores which shaped the applicable
law of self-defense-a law which fails to include women's experiences
and perspectives. 7
Until this decade, domestic violence against women had not been
recognized as a social problem." Criminal prosecutions often repre-
of the public. Richard, then 16, was convicted of manslaughter in the shooting death of his
abusive father and Deborah, then 17, was convicted of aiding and abetting. After a lifetime of
experiencing physical, emotional and sexual abuse of Deborah, Richard surprised his unsus-
pecting father in the garage with a shotgun blast which killed him instantly. Richard served 4
months in a psychiatric facility and 11 months in juvenile detention and Deborah served 22
months in a facility for disturbed teenagers before they were released by intervention from the
governor. A. PRENDERGAST, THE POISON TREE (1986). For German cases, see infra notes
193 & 219.
5. Of 100 battered German women who sought help from the police, none received the
requested help. Kappel & Lueteritz, Wife Battering in the Federal Republic of Germany, 5
VICTIMOLOGY: AN INT'L J. 225, 237 (1980) [hereinafter Kappel & Lueteritz]. Tracey Thur-
man, a Torrington, Connecticut woman who was partially paralyzed and heavily scarred in a
knife attack by her husband while a police officer watched without intervening, won a
landmark $2.3 million judgement against the police department, in June 1985. She claimed
denial of equal protection since the police treated her complaints less seriously than they
would have if she had been attacked by a stranger. Shattering Domestic Violence, VERMONT'S
NEWS AND ARTS WEEKLY, Oct. 6, 1985, at 10 [hereinafter Shattering Domestic Violence].
Women are discouraged from using the criminal justice system by being required to personally
file against their spouses. See Herman, Prosecution of Spouse Abuse.- Innovations in Criminal
Justice Response, in 4 RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY, WASHINGTON D.C.: CENTER
FOR WOMEN'S POLICY STUDIES (1981). This requirement is de jure in Germany. See para.
232 of the German Criminal Code, Strafgesetzbuch, with introduction by H. H. Jescheck, 20
Auflage, Stand Dec. 1, 1981, Deutscher Taschen buch Verlag, Munich, in force since Jan. 1,
1975, [hereinafter StGB]. Conviction and punishment are rare and women are unprotected
between arrest and trial. Cooper, Duties and Enforcement Mechanisms for the Rights of Bat-
tered Women, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 937 (1982).
6. A woman is beaten every 18 seconds in the United States, according to estimates
based on FBI statistics. Wolfgang, Violence in the Family, in VIOLENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON
MURDER AND AGGRESSION 245 (1978). Sixty percent of American families experience vio-
lence. BATTERED WOMEN 14 (D. M. Moore, ed. 1979). In Germany it is estimated that one
in every five women are battered. Kappel & Lueteritz, supra note 5, at 234.
7. A husband's right to physically chastise his wife is a tenant of the common law. See
generally W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, in collected works by Christian, Chitty, Lee,
Hovenden, and Ryland, at 366 (1864) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE]. Violence against women is
sanctioned implicitly in interspousal tort immunity and explicitly in rape laws. In 27 states a
man cannot be charged for raping his wife. OFF OUR BACKS, Feb. 1985, at 3; Paragraph 177
StGB defines rape as "ausserehelichen," outside of marriage.
8. Terms such as "domestic violence," "marital conflict," and "spouse abuse" have be-
come popular with public agencies trying to diffuse criticism from the women's movement of
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sent the final blow for battered women who kill their mates. Prisons9
and mental institutions' ° are filled with women whose defensive ac-
tions have not been recognized for what they are. When defenses
have been asserted for women who kill they generally have been those
of an impaired mental state,II since their actions are so aberrant to
traditional feminine norms that women defendants are readily per-
ceived as insane.
I2
As the depth and horror of violence against women have come to
light, the resistance of women has taken on a new validity. Women
are pressing to have their actions viewed not as "insane," but as a
rational response to continuous escalating violence in battering
relationships.
The recent wave of battered women 13 who assert that the killing
of their mates is justified has placed the traditional norms in question
and forced re-evaluation of self-defense law. In the process, Anglo-
American jurists have been confronted with the fundamental distinc-
tion between justification and excuse, a topic which, until the recent
efforts of Professor George Fletcher,14 has rarely captured the imagi-
their policies toward battered women. The terms are misleading in that they suggest mutual
spats and obscure the reality that it is men who are beating women.
9. McAllister, Women in Prison: Victims of Domestic Violence, Hearings on Battering
and the Criminal Behavior of Women at Bedford Hills, OFF OUR BACKS, Jan. 1986, at 17-18.
10. Psychologist Phyllis Chesler has documented a double standard of mental health for
men and women. For a woman to be considered "healthy she must adjust to and accept the
behavioral norms for her sex even though these kinds of behavior are generally regarded as less
socially desirable." The consequences for women who engage in "male" activities include psy-
chiatric commitment, ostracism, and punishment. P. CHESLER, WOMEN AND MADNESS
(1972).
11. Researchers posit that female prisoners show a greater degree of psychiatric illness
than male prisoners since crime is such an unusual activity for women that only those who are
unusually high scorers on psychoticism scales overcome the social barriers which keep women
in their place. Further, women murderers are judged to be more disturbed than their male
counterparts since women's use of violence is a greater deviation from role norms than male
violence. Women also have less social validation for their actions and hence may feel more
disturbed. Blum & Fisher, Women Who Kill, in VIOLENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON MURDER AND
AGGRESSION 193 (1978).
12. College students in a 1974 study were read violent murder cases in which the insanity
plea was entered, with the sex of the hypothetical defendant varying. Female defendants were
seen as "sick" more often than male defendants under the same fact pattern. Sex role expecta-
tions and biases influenced the observers designation of women murderers as disturbed and
insane. Id. at 194.
13. For a listing of some of the earliest cases, see Schneider & Jordan, Representation of
Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Rape and Sexual Assault, 4 THE NAT'L J. OF
CRIM. DEF. 141 [hereinafter Schneider & Jordan]; see also Defending Battered Women Who
Kill, OFF OUR BACKS, Mar. 1983, at 26.
14. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
nation of the American legal community. A series of acquittals in
sleeping husband cases has highlighted the lack of contour in our
analysis of justification and excuse. A search for clarity in this area
lends itself to a comparative discussion of West German law, in which
the constructs of justification and excuse have been carefully clarified
and refined by scholars for three-quarters of a century. 15
Two fact patterns arise in battered women's cases which pose
separate legal issues and find different solutions in the German and
American systems. In the first scenario, women kill their abusive
mates in response to an imminent or actual attack. In American law,
the killing can be justified if the defense was both necessary (no lesser
means available), and proportional (the harm caused by stopping the
attacker not disproportional to the potential harm to be suffered by
the defender). German law demands no proportionality per se, but
rather requires a determination of whether the defender overstepped
the "social-ethical" limits imposed by the courts on defense of one
spouse against the other.
In the second and more difficult fact pattern, women kill their
mates when there is no present attack and utilize men's inattention
and helplessness to accomplish their goal. I 6 According to criminolo-
gists, the physical disparity between women and men leads women to
kill when their mates are asleep, drunk, ill or otherwise unable to re-
sist.17 The discussion has been lively in both systems as to whether
either justified defenses (self-defense, preventative defense, self-de-
fense analogous situations) or excuses (self-defense, necessity) offer an
appropriate means of disposition of the "sleeping husband" cases. At-
torneys representing battered women have been both creative and
zealous in the use of existing legal tools,18 while simultaneously push-
ing for the creation of alternatives. It is in this spirit that a defensive
strategy known as battered women's self-defense or the battered wo-
men's defense 19 has arisen in American law as a mishmash of self-
Criminal Theory, 8 ISRAEL L. REV. 367 (1973) [hereinafter Fletcher, Proportionality]; G.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978) [hereinafter FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW].
15. For a short history of the development of German legal thought on the topic, see
Eser, Justification and Excuse, Symposium on the New German Penal Code, 124 AM. J. COMP.
L. 638 (1976) [hereinafter Eser].
16. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 646 (1980) [hereinafter Schneider].
17. C. SMART, WOMEN, CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE 18 (1977).
18. WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES: THEORY AND PRACTICE (E. Bochnak, ed. 1981).
19. Schneider & Jordan, supra note 13. There is a great deal of confusion in the literature
(Vol. 10:1
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defense, necessity and insanity. While I welcome the acquittals of
battered women, I critique this inappropriate expansion of the law of
self-defense in cases where there is no present attack.
I advocate instead that the defense of personal necessity be
adopted and applied to excuse desperate killings by desperate women.
This article is my contribution to the search for legal solutions for
battered women which provide both greater clarity in the law and a
formal recognition of our compassion for individuals who react in
human ways to the inhumanity of oppression and other life-threaten-
ing circumstances.
We begin with an overview of justification and excuse, then
briefly examine the development of self-defense as a male standard
and the norms called into question by the introduction of women's
perspective. We then analyze the actual basis of the battered women's
defense-the excuse of personal necessity-and the problems result-
ing from its introduction in American law as self-defense, a justifica-
tion. Finally, we examine the German approach to self-defense and
necessity-an examination which raises as many questions as it seems
to answer, but in the process provides us with some insights into our
own system.
II. JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE
The question of justification or excuse arises in those circum-
stances in which the actor's conduct satisfies the literal terms of a
defined crime. In other words, a harm has been inflicted which the
criminal law has endeavored to prevent, for example, homicide.
Despite the harm, there are situations in which the actor's con-
duct is not only deemed not to be wrongful, but is considered rightful
behavior, that is, her conduct is justified. A police officer's fatal
shooting of an armed and dangerous felon in the course of a kidnap-
ping causes the harm (homicide) which the law seeks to prevent, but
under circumstances which make it a socially approved choice of
conduct.
Justified conduct is considered as the right and proper choice of
action in a given situation, that is, preferable to all available alterna-
tives. The focus in determining whether certain conduct is justified is
on the act itself, not on the actor. Everyone in the same circum-
as to whether there is a separate defense or that battered women's syndrome is merely an
adjunct to a self-defense plea. The latter is the better view. Thyfault, Self-Defense, Battered
Woman's Syndrome on Trial, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 485, 495 (1984).
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stances could act in the same manner with impunity.20
An acquittal based on justification carves out an exception to the
prohibited conduct and generates a rule for future cases; behavior
which is justified is rightful and lawful and hence does not warrant
the interference or prohibition of the criminal law. 21 Excused behav-
ior, on the contrary, is wrongful conduct. When an act lacks justifica-
tion, the inquiry shifts to the actor to determine whether she should
be held accountable for the wrong.22 An excuse operates to relieve the
actor from the criminal consequences of her act under circumstances
in which the act cannot fairly be imputed to the character of the ac-
tor. If the circumstances or character of the actor are such that she
could not fairly be expected to avoid committing the act, the law re-
lieves her from responsibility, since there is no inference that can be
drawn from the wrongful act as to the character of the actor. 23 Hence
in circumstances of mistake, duress, necessity, and insanity, society is
willing to tolerate and excuse wrongful conduct. An acquittal based
on excuse leaves the substantive norm of the criminal law
unaffected.
24
Justification treats the act as objectively lawful, while excuse
merely considers that subjectively the actor is not blameworthy. 25
This distinction has important implications. For the defendant, both
excuse and justification preclude criminal punishment for an offense
in West Germany and in most U.S. jurisdictions. However, special
provisions may require hospital commitment in insanity cases. 26 Par-
tial excuses, such as provocation, intoxication, and diminished capac-
ity do not entirely exculpate the actor, but can lower the degree of
gravity of the offense for which she'll be held accountable.
The victim's and third parties' right to resist or intervene without
criminal consequences turn on whether the conduct is justified or
20. Fletcher, Proportionality, supra note 14, at 373-75. For a complete discussion of justi-
fication and excuse, see FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 14, at 759-875.
21. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 14, at 575-77.
22. Fletcher, Proportionality, supra note 14, at 373-75; FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMI-
NAL LAW, supra note 14, at 798-885.
23. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269,
1271 (1974) [hereinafter Fletcher, Individualization].
24. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 14, at 575-77; Robinson,
Criminal Law Defense: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 256 (1982) [hereinafter
Robinson]. For a contrary view, see Hall, Comment on Justification and Excuse, Symposium
on the New German Penal Code, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 638, 644 (1976).
25. Eser, supra note 15, at 628.
26. Id. at 623.
[Vol. 10:1
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merely excused.27 Justified acts reflect a higher social interest and are
encouraged as proper, not only for the actor, but generate a corre-
sponding right of action and intervention for third parties. Excuses,
on the other hand, are merely personal to the actor and confer no
such privilege on third parties to assist in the wrongful act. Further,
there is no right to resist a justified act, since it has the imprimatur of
society. Excused conduct is concededly wrongful in nature and can
be resisted by the victim or any third party acting to protect the
victim.
III. NECESSARY DEFENSES: SELF-DEFENSE AND NECESSITY
The defenses most applicable to our discussion of battered wo-
men's cases are necessity and self-defense. An overview 28 is in order
before we turn to their specific utility in America and West Germany.
The defense of necessity is triggered when natural conditions converge
to force an actor to engage in conduct which otherwise fulfills the
elements of a criminal offense. The defense can operate as either a
justification or an excuse. A justification is applicable when the actor
responds to the necessity situation by choosing the lesser of evils
presented. The competing interests are simply compared. If the ac-
tor's choice represents the better right in that particular situation, her
action is justified. A classic example is the intentional dynamiting of a
house which stands in the path of an approaching fire in order to stop
the fire's spread and save an entire town from destruction.
For our purposes, a balancing test of necessity affords no justifi-
cation where the harm threatened (for example, rape or beating) is
less than the harm caused (the death of the attacker). The balancing
of interests could never result in a justification for homicide even in a
"kill or be killed" situation since presumably the lives of both parties
are of equal value.29 In any event, the certainty of the victim's death
is generally posited against the lesser probability of the actor's. This
is definitely the situation in the sleeping husband cases since the man's
death is certain while the women's is merely speculative.
When the objective balancing of interests fails to tip the scales in
favor of the defendant, her conduct can not be justified under the ne-
cessity (lesser evils) standard as rightful conduct. When the impor-
tant interests of life, limb, and liberty of the defendant are
27. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 14, at 760.
28. Fletcher, Individualization, supra note 23, at 1276.
29. Id. at 1278.
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endangered, the West German system also recognizes necessity as an
excuse and focuses on the culpability of the defender for her wrongful
act.
30
The excuse extends to protecting the important interests of rela-
tives or other persons close to the defendant. If a mother attempts to
save her child from a burning theater and in the process causes two
others to be trampled to death, she has committed a wrongful act.
But her conduct is not blameworthy since one could hardly expect her
to act otherwise and watch her child die.31 If the convergence of cir-
cumstances under which the defendant acted exerted sufficient pres-
sure to deprive her of her ability to refrain from the wrongful
conduct, the necessity of acting will excuse her conduct even in cases
where she kills to protect her own vital interests.
The common law assessment of necessity as a defense goes no
further than a balancing of interests. Anglo-American jurists, who
hesitate to leave unpunished the concededly wrongful conduct of de-
fenders weighing in on the light side of the scale, have failed to appre-
ciate or apply necessity as an excuse. 32 Despite the convergence of
circumstances which account for the defender's shortcomings, Anglo-
American judges pragmatically rule out compassion and instead
choose to punish even "involuntary" actors to prevent what they
characterize as a legitimization of homicide.
Since under the standard of necessity, sleeping husband homi-
cides can neither be justified, nor-in American law--excused, attor-
neys who represent battered women are left with few possibilities
other than insanity defenses 33 and self-defense. Self-defense has been
the preferred choice since it justifies a woman's actions and requires
no hospital commitment. Attorneys have attempted to elasticize the
30. Eser, supra note 15, at 636-37.
31. Schmidhaeuser, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 2 Auflage, Tuebingen, 1975, at 463.
32. Fletcher, Individualization, supra note 23, at 1278-88; Wasik, A Case of Necessity?,
1984 CRIM. L. REV. 544 (Summer).
33. The first battered women's murder case brought to the attention of the public was
that of a Michigan mother of four, Francine Hughes, who on March 9, 1977, set her husband's
bed on fire as he lay sleeping. Although feminists who rallied to her cause insisted that she
acted in self-defense, her attorney preferred to base his case on tried and true legal doctrines.
Hughes, who had been severely battered for 12 years, was acquitted on grounds of temporary
insanity. Her story received national attention with a major TV film, The Burning Bed, star-
ring Farrah Fawcett-Majors. For a new twist to an old defense, see Randolph, The Diminished
Capacity Defense for Battered Women: An Alternative Political Approach, 70 WOMEN LAW. J.
23 (1984).
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requirements of self-defense to provide a legal way out for their
clients.
Self-defense has aptly been described as a part of the law of ne-
cessity with fixed rules. The common law of self-defense has evolved
from the 13th century excuse of se-defendo into a present day justifi-
cation. Under a strict balancing of interests (lesser evils) approach, a
person forced to take a life even to save her own from deadly attack
could not be justified. Historically, killings even in self-preservation
were merely excused. Se-defendo, or excused self-defense, excused a
killing when the actor had no other means to save herself. Although
largely influenced by the circumstances of a life-threatening assault,
the killing was considered a wrongful act, leaving the culpable actor
subject to a forfeiture of goods. 34 It was unimportant who the initial
aggressor in the fray was, so long as the actor retreated to the wall
and was left with no other choice but to kill or be killed.
Se-defendo is similar to the excuse of personal necessity, in that
life-threatening circumstances rob the defender of the voluntariness of
her conduct. In short, the hand that pulls the trigger is forced by the
situation, not the free will of the actor, who under normal circum-
stances would not kill.
The common law of self-defense has since evolved into a justifica-
tion which alters the strict "lesser evils" standard required for a ne-
cessity justification. It allows the scales in an equipoised life versus
life situation to be tipped in the defender's favor by factoring in the
culpability of the aggressor. This diminution of the aggressor's inter-
ests suffices to provide a justification for killing not only to protect
life, but also for other weighty interests, as for example, to prevent
serious physical harm, or rape.35
German law also justifies self-defense, but under a different the-
ory. This justification rests on the dual premises of vindication of the
personal autonomy of the defender and the defense of the legal or-
der.3 6 While in theory, the aggressor's interests play no role in the
determination of justified conduct, in practice, the courts in recent
years have begun to balance the interests of attacker and defender. As
we will see in the final section on West German law, the underlying
34. Fletcher, Proportionality, supra note 14, at 376-80; Robinson, supra note 28, at 235.
35. Fabricant, Homicide in Response to a Threat of Rape; a Theoretical Examination of
the Rule of Justification, 11 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 945 (1981); Kates & Engberg, Deadly
Force Self-Defense Against Rape, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 873 (1982).
36. H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 270 (1978); see
infra notes 101 & 131.
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theories of self-defense create different tensions and provide different
resolutions in each legal system.
IV. AMERICAN LAW
A. Women's Self-Defense Cases
Self-defense laws developed at a time when women had no in-
dependent legal status and were protected and controlled by fathers
and husbands. The law allowed men to correct and physically chas-
tise their wives. 37 As William Blackstone wrote in Commentaries On
The Law Of England, although a man who killed his spouse might be
charged with murder, a wife who killed her husband faced the addi-
tional charge of petit treason for rebelling against her husband's au-
thority and the authority of the state. She faced being burned at the
stake for violating God's ordained natural order.
The law presupposed that women had no right to exercise vio-
lence on their own behalf.38 Self-defense law developed in this context
as an exclusively male standard. Violence exercised by men to protect
their property and honor, 39 bar room brawls and "chance medleys,"
provided the back drop for the crystallization of traditional norms. 4°
Many decades of "reasonable men" shooting, stabbing and clubbing
each other to death produced a common law of self-defense which
adequately speaks to men's needs.
The male character of the law41 and sexual stereotypes have tra-
ditionally prevented judges and juries from appreciating the circum-
37. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 366; noting the connection between a husband's
former right to chastise his wife (Zueschtigungsrecht) and the current limitation on spousal
self-defense in Germany is Geilen, Eingeschraenkte Notwehr unter Ehegatten?, JURISTISCHE
RUNDSCHAU 314, 317 (1976) [hereinafter Geilen].
38. On the other hand, in keeping with their role of nurturer, women were allowed and
expected to use violence to protect their children. The law still allows women more leeway
when they are acting on behalf of their children than when they are defending themselves. For
example, see the recent decision of the German Supreme Court, infra note 186.
39. The protection of male honor, even at the cost of human life, has played an important
role in shaping self-defense law and is reflected in the "true man" doctrine which allows a
defender to kill rather than retreat. For the German sentiment that no one is duty bound to
cowardly retreat, especially in the company of a woman, see BGHSt, Goltdammer's Archivfuer
Strafrecht at 147 (1965).
40. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 1113-43 (3d ed. 1982).
41. In some cases the law is explicit in its exclusion of women, as in the paramour laws
which permitted a husband, but not a wife, to kill a person caught "in flagrante delicto" with
his spouse. Schneider & Jordan, supra note 13, at 150. In general, the exclusion is implicit in
the terms and standards embodied in the law. "[I]n all [the] mass of authorities which [bear]
upon this branch of the law there is no single mention of a reasonable woman ..... A.
HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 13 (4th ed. 1928).
[Vol. 10:1
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stances of women's acts of self-defense. In the past decade defense
attorneys have attempted to incorporate women's experiences and
perspectives into existing concepts of self-defense law to offset its male
orientation.
In a landmark decision reversing Yvonne Wanrow's 1975 mur-
der conviction for killing a child molester, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that comparing the defendant's behavior to that of a
"reasonable man' 42 violated her right to equal protection of the law.43
The court approved as the standard of self-defense, that the reasona-
bleness of a woman's actions be judged "in light of her own percep-
tions of the situation, including those perceptions which [are] the
product of our nation's long and unfortunate history of sex
discrimination."44
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed women's right to de-
fend themselves, at the same time recognizing the socialization which
impedes their ability to do so. The court acknowledged that when the
defendant is female, there are special circumstances which the jury
must be told about in order to be able to evaluate the reasonableness
of her beliefs and actions. Depending on the individual defendant,
this may include her lack of self-defense or other physical skill train-
ing, her socialization into a submissive role, passivity, and helpless-
ness, and her previous experience with violence.
The approach taken by the defense in Wanrow has been a model
for other women's self-defense cases. In particular, it has been used
42. The instruction not only establishes an objective standard, but through the per-
sistent use of the masculine gender leaves the jury the impression the ... standard to
be applied is that applicable to an altercation between two men. The impression
created-that a 5'4" woman with a cast on her leg and using a crutch must, under
the law, somehow repel an assault by a 6'2" intoxicated man without employing
weapons in her defense, unless the jury finds her determination of the degree of dan-
ger to be objectively reasonable-constitutes a separate and distinct misstatement of
the law and, in the context of this case, violates the respondent's right to equal pro-
tection of the law. The respondent was entitled to have the jury consider her actions
in light of her own perceptions ....
State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 240, 559 P.2d 548, 558-59 (1977).
43. Until such time as the effects of... history are eradicated, care must be taken to
assure that our self-defense instructions afford women the right to have their conduct
judged in light of the individual physical handicaps which are the product of sex
discrimination. To fail to do so is to deny the rights of the individual woman in-
volved to trial by the same rules which are applicable to male defendants.
88 Wash. 2d at 240-41, 559 P.2d at 559. Arguing to the contrary that the fourteenth amend-
ment prohibits the battered women's defense as invidious gender based sex discrimination, see
Rittenmeyer, Of Battered Wives, Self-defense, and Double Standards of Justice, 9 J. CRIM.
JUST. 389 (1981) [hereinafter Rittenmeyer].
44. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d at 221, 559 P.2d at 548.
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with a measure of success in cases of battered women who kill their
attackers. Often referred to as the battered women's defense, this ap-
proach is characterized by the attempt to expand the relevant time
period in self-defense cases from a single moment of attack and de-
fense to include a history of long-term escalating violence.45 The de-
fense often relies heavily on the use of expert testimony on the
Battered Women's Syndrome46 to explain a woman's inability to leave
a battering situation and to offset sexist stereotypes about battered
women which place the blame for violence on the victim, rather than
the batterer.
1. The Killing of Attacking Men
If the facts presented at trial show that a woman was being at-
tacked at the moment she killed, a court should merely move on to
consider the necessity for and the reasonableness of the defensive
force used. Yet even in the straightforward attack/defend cases, prej-
udice against battered women and sexist assumptions about the na-
ture of battering relationships combined with the male bias of the law
often leave female defendants at a disadvantage in the court's consid-
eration of such factors as the duty to retreat and proportionality.
2. The Duty to Retreat
The retreat rule requires that before resorting to deadly force, a
defender must make every reasonable attempt to flee.47 The origins of
this rule lie in se-defendo-where killing to save oneself was excused
only if it was a last resort.48 The common law's self-defense variation
of lesser evils leads to the same result since the loss of honor to the
defender who retreats is minimal in comparison with the loss of life to
the aggressor. The well recognized exception is that a person is under
no obligation to flee from their own home, even when the attacker
also lives there. 49 Recently, however, courts are balking at the tradi-
tional exception and imposing a duty to retreat when one is attacked
45. Vaughn & Moore, The Battered Spouse Defense in Kentucky, ION. Ky. L.J. 399, 411
(1983) [hereinafter Vaughn & Moore].
46. Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L.
REV. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Walker, et. al.].
47. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 395 (1975).
48. For an interesting discussion of the retreat rule, its origins, and its compatibility with
various theories of self-defense, see Fletcher, supra note 14, at 864-68.
49. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 47, at 395-96.
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by a co-resident5 0
The retreat rule may have a major impact on the cases of bat-
tered women who kill. Battered women are often blamed for staying
in abusive relationships with the result that judges and jurors feel they
are at fault for the beatings, enjoy them, or at least get what they
deserve for not leaving.
Retreat presupposes women have somewhere else to go. The few
existing women's shelters-overcrowded and underfunded 5 '-cannot
provide a realistic alternative for every woman. Many women are
simply too frightened to leave,52 are unaware of their options, or re-
fuse to abandon their children to violent men. 53 Others have at-
tempted leaving in the past but were unsuccessful or forcibly dragged
back by their husbands. 5
4
As the battered women's defense attempts to expand the relevant
time frame in self-defense from a single moment of attack to include
the entire long-term violent relationship, apparent opportunities for
leaving may be revealed. This is particularly true in sleeping husband
cases where walking out the door seems to be an obvious alternative
to killing. Expert testimony on Battered Women's Syndrome can as-
sist the jury in understanding the women's inability to leave and her
actual or perceived lack of options. 55
3. Degree of Force
According to traditional formulations, in a self-defense situation,
the amount of force a defender is privileged to use must be commen-
50. Simonton, Criminal Law. Privilege of Non-retreat in the Home not Applicable if Vic-
tim and Accused Co-occupy Dwelling, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 167 (1983).
51. For a scathing attack on United States funding agencies' policies, see DOBASH,
EMERSON & EMERSON, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES (1980), reviewed by Fields, 6 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 227 (1980). For the German experience, see Metz-Goeckel, Strukturelle und
Personale Gewalt gegen Frauen und die Schwierigkeit ihrer Au/hebung, DAS VERBRECHEN'S
OPFER, Studienverlag Dr. Norman Brockmeyer Bochum 415 (1979) [hereinafter Metz-
Goeckel].
52. Fear is the biggest reason women stay with or return to a batterer. Other reasons are
fear of losing their children, a desire to preserve the marriage, emotional attachment and psy-
chological approval. Meyers, Battered Women, Dead Husbands, Mar. 1978 STUDENT LAW.
MAG. 48.
53. Women have good reason to be afraid of leaving. Ninety-nine out of 100 cases in
which men beat, shot, choked, stabbed or burned their mates to death, the woman was at-
tempting to break out of the relationship. Bis der Tod Euch scheide, EMMA, Jan. 1980, at 22.
54. Schneider, supra note 16, at 633.
55. Note, Battered Women Syndrome: Admissibility of Expert Testimony for the Defense,
47 Mo. L. REV. 835 (1982).
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surate with the threatened harm. The law allows the use of deadly
force only to prevent the infliction of unlawful death or serious bodily
harm. Deadly force is not privileged in response to non-deadly
force.
56
Women's self-defense cases often involve the use of deadly force
against weaponless attackers. Proportionality standards which pre-
suppose equal combatants and fail to account for the differences in
socialization, physical size and skill training between women and their
attackers, can be especially damaging. Men can and regularly do kill
women with their bare hands, a feat which few women can
accomplish.
Ineffective resistance by a woman may incite an attacker to
greater,57 even murderous, violence. Since many women are unable to
muster any form of unarmed defense, their only hope of stopping an
attack requires the use of weapons. The courts have tended to view
women's resort to deadly force as unacceptable under traditional stan-
dards, which equate appropriate behavior with that of a "reasonable
man."' 58
B. The Killing of Non-Attacking Men
Rarely do battered women kill at the precise moment of attack.
Dr. Lenore Walker, a psychiatric expert who has done extensive re-
search on battering relationships, describes a cycle of violence known
as the "Battered Women's Syndrome." This syndrome helps to ex-
plain the victimization of women by their husbands, including their
helplessness and inability to leave the battering situation. 59 The cycle
consists of three stages-tension building, the explosive battering inci-
dent,60 and the loving, apologetic calm period following a beating.
6'
56. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 47, at 393.
57. Two-thirds of the battered women in a 1979 study at the Berlin Women's Shelter
indicated they had attempted self-defense, which generally resulted in more intense beatings.
Kappel & Lueteritz, supra note 5, at 235.
58. In Wanrow, the use of a reasonable man proportionality standard was held violative
of equal protection guarantees. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 240, 559 P.2d 548, 559
(1977). Arguably, even reference to a reasonable person would unduly prejudice women.
Chesler found that there are different expectations of behavior for "women," and "persons,"
the latter being equivalent to expectations for male behavior. P. CHESLER, supra note 10, at
86.
59. Walker, et. al., supra note 46, at 1-14.
60. Rather than a momentary loss of control, the beatings are frequently prolonged
and sadistic. In [a] Michigan study, for example, of twenty abused wives, six were
beaten severely enough to require hospitalization. In that study alone there were
four concussions, four miscarriages, one fractured jaw, one dislocated shoulder, one
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The violence escalates in frequency and intensity over time.62 Most
women, according to Walker, kill during the first of the three stages
that comprise a battering incident. 63 When the tension in this stage
has mounted to a point beyond which violence is inevitable, many
women act to avoid being beaten. Walker's research established that
battered women often know when a beating is coming because of sig-
nals from the batterer. Walker indicates that this occurrence is quite
common, although the precise sign varies. 64 A battered woman,
whose security and survival hinges on her ability to read her hus-
band's signals, becomes adept at recognizing the immediacy of im-
pending beatings.
65
Similarly, a number of women kill their attackers during a hiatus
in the beating or immediately after the episode of violence subsides.
66
Battered women live with the realization that they are powerless to
stop their mates from killing them at whim. The aftermath of a beat-
ing intensifies women's perceptions of the precariousness of their situ-
ation. Each increasingly violent act provides further evidence of their
vulnerability and heightens their fear and distress.
The violence in battering relationships is so severe, escalating and
inevitable that the aftermath of one beating is equally the prelude for
broken and one set of cracked ribs. One woman was burned on her breasts by a
lighted cigarette . . . . None of the wives report that the beatings were of the one
punch variety. The beatings lasted anywhere from five or ten minutes to over an
hour.
Yankowski, Wife Abuse, 3 FEMINIST ALLIANCE AGAINST RAPE NEWSL., Spr. 1976 at 13
[hereinafter Yankowski], citing Eisenberg & Patricia, The Assaulted Wife: Catch 22 Revisited
(unpublished study at the University of Michigan Law School, Nov. 1, 1974).
61. Walker, et. al., supra note 46, at 4.
62. The short term effect on men of beatings is to reduce the tension and provide emo-
tional release. But to the extent the tension release is produced by violence, this immediate
effect is likely to powerfully reinforce the violence which preceeded it. S. STEINMETZ & M.
STRAUSS, VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY 16 (1975).
63. Walker, et. al., supra note 46, at 4.
64. Leavitt & Abrams, Cassandra Peten: Judge Rejects Battered Woman Defense, 10
CONSPIRACY Mar. 1 (1979).
65. In the first case in federal court in which testimony on battered women's syndrome
was ruled admissible, Mary Louise Player was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting
her husband after a severe rape and beating. Although she shot him while he was lying down,
her attorney argued self-defense, contending that a battered woman can perceive an imminent
threat of violence from her husband-which may be imperceptible to outsiders-because of his
movements or words. Player received a three-year sentence. OFF OUR BACKS, Mar. 1983 at
27.
66. See, e.g., State v. Anaya, 8 A.2d 392 (Me. 1981). The possibility of a self-defense
justification was recognized by the court although the defendant stabbed her boyfriend in the
back following a beating. The woman was convicted of manslaughter on retrial. State v.
Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255 (Me. 1983).
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
the next. The cycle of abuse, dubbed "murder by installment, ' 67 often
culminates in severe bodily harm or death to the woman. 68 An anal-
ogy can be made to slow poisoning where death is the cumulative
effect of many doses although no individual dose is lethal. A woman's
life may be as seriously jeopardized by a long-term relationship of
violent abuse as it would be in a one time deadly attack which justifies
an equivalent deadly force defense.
This newest research on battered women has lead defense attor-
neys to argue that a lower threshold of instant aggression may justify
the defensive actions of a battered woman in cases where the aggres-
sor has a history of abusive behavior.69 When there is no imminent
attack, which triggers the right to self-defense, the dangerousness of
the attacker's conduct and the impending threat of physical harm that
would allow a deadly force response can only be seen through the eyes
of the battered woman. To an outside observer the woman's physi-
cal integrity might not appear immediately threatened.
In numerous cases involving battered women defendants, attor-
neys have attempted to offer expert testimony on the Battered Wo-
men's Syndrome to show that, considering the cycle of violence in
abusive relationships and the specific dynamics of battering, the belief
of a battered woman that she was in a situation where she must de-
fend herself was indeed reasonable.
"Individualization" is the key, according to Elizabeth Schneider,
a pioneer in women's self-defense cases.70 She posits that the social
conditioning of a female defendant may cause her to reasonably per-
ceive imminent, life-threatening danger in situations in which a man
might not. This reasonable belief would justify her recourse to deadly
force, just as it would for a man who perceived such threatening cir-
cumstances. 71 Schneider advocates that the jury be presented with all
the individual differences, characteristics and capacities of the defend-
ant when deciding whether her actions constituted self-defense.
The success of a self-defense plea often directly hinges on the
defense's ability to introduce expert testimony on the Battered Wo-
men's Syndrome.72 State supreme courts have gone both ways on the
67. Eisenberg & Seymour, The Self-Defense Plea and Battered Women, 14 TRIAL 41
[hereinafter Eisenberg & Seymour].
68. Id. at 41.
69. Id.
70. Schneider, supra note 16, at 639.
71. Schneider & Jordan, supra note 13, at 144.
72. Experts are not always necessary when the woman is capable of articulating her own
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admission of expert testimony.73 While the admission of expert testi-
mony is no guarantee for acquittal, this strategy has led to a surpris-
ing number of acquittals even in cases where there is not even a hint
of an attack. Acquittals under these circumstances amount to nullifi-
cation of traditional self-defense requirements.
C. Reasonable Belief: Conceptual Problems with the Battered
Women's Defense
Present day statutes treat self-defense as a justification, represent-
ing society's interest in combating unwarranted physical aggression
and interference with bodily integrity and security. The focus in de-
termining justified conduct is on the act itself, which either does or
does not meet objective requirements. The objective requirement in
self-defense is wrongful aggression and the inquiry into the defend-
ant's personal situation is narrowly limited to the issue of whether she
acted with the will to defend herself.
74
The determination of justified conduct logically precedes an in-
quiry into the defendant's personal situation which can at best offer
an excuse for an unjustified act. It cannot transform an unjustified act
into a justified one, no matter how reasonable the defendant's percep-
tions or compassion worthy her situation.
The individualized inquiry advocated by Schneider, which un-
derlies battered women's self-defense, is based on a theory most fully
developed by George Fletcher. 75 Fletcher posits that to receive a fair
trial the defendant's particular circumstances must be fully consid-
ered by the trier of fact. The important point that Schneider over-
looks is that Fletcher's plea for individualized treatment relates to
excusing conditions, not a determination of justifying circumstances.
To consider a personalized inquiry into subjective excusing factors,
before determining whether or not a wrong has been committed, is
putting the cart before the horse. 76
To a large extent, the battered women's defense capitalizes on the
experience and should be used with caution lest they encourage sexual stereotyping and alien-
ate the jury. Schneider, supra note 16, at 646.
73. Kass, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome in
Support of a Claim of Self-Defense, 15 CONN. L. REV. 121 (1982); Thar, The Admissibility of
Expert Testimony on Battered Wife Syndrome. An Evidentiary Analysis, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 348
(1982).
74. Fletcher, Proportionality, supra note 14, at 768.
75. Fletcher, Individualization, supra note 23.
76. Hassemer, Justification and Excuse in Criminal Law. Theses and Comments, 1986
B.Y.U. L. REV. 573 [hereinafter Hassemer, Justification and Excuse]. For an article discuss-
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confusing formulation of self-defense law which allows a "reasonable
belief" in imminent danger of bodily harm to suffice for justification. 77
The common law has had a difficult time sorting out just what the
mixture of objectivity and subjectivity in self-defense should be. "Be-
lief" is an entirely subjective experience. "Reasonable" is an attempt
to objectify an otherwise totally permissive standard.
If there is an actual attack, the question of the reasonableness of
the defender's belief does not arise. A correct belief corresponds with
an actual objective state of affairs and will always be reasonable. A
reasonable belief, on the other hand, will not always be a correct be-
lief.78 When the defender's belief is incorrect we are then dealing with
a question of mistake and the issue of reasonableness relates to the
culpability of the actor in making that mistake. A reasonable mistake
as to the existence of an attack may indeed excuse an actor, but could
never justify wrongful conduct.
- According to the "reasonable belief" definition self-defense is
justified not only in response to a present or imminent attack, but also
when the defender believes there is an attack although none actually
exists. This situation is called putative self-defense. When a defender
injures or kills an aggressor in the mistaken belief she was being at-
tacked, her mistaken defense, according to the common law, can be
justified to the same extent as if an attack actually had taken place.
Variations of this formulation of self-defense can be found in the
Model Penal Code and states which have conformed their codes to its
example. 79 Most states require that the defendant's mistake be rea-
sonable, but the Model Penal Code, going one step further, does not,
ing this and other papers presented at the 1984 Freiburg Criminal Theory workshop, see infra
note 102.
77. He who is not the aggresor in an encounter is justified in using a reasonable
amount of force against his adversary when he reasonably believes (a) that he is in
immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary and (b) that the use of
such force is necessary to avoid this danger.
It may be reasonable to use non-deadly force against the adversary's non-deadly
attack (i.e., one threatening only bodily harm), and to use deadly force against his
deadly attack (an attack threatening death or serious bodily harm), but it is never
reasonable to use deadly force against this non-deadly attack.
There is a dispute as to whether one threatened with a deadly attack must re-
treat, if he can safely do so, before resorting to deadly force, except that it is agreed
that he need not retreat from his home or place of business.
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 47, at 391.
78. Comment, Criminal Law-Self-Defense Jury Instructions Given on Subjective Stan-
dard of Reasonableness in Self-Defense Do Not Require a Specific Instruction on Battered Wo-
man Syndrome, 60 N.D.L. REV. 141 (1984).
79. "[T]he use of force upon or toward another person is justified when the actor believes
that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use
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although unreasonable actors may be liable for offenses capable of
negligent commission, such as manslaughter.80 The problems arising
from the equation of a mistaken defense with an actual defense can
best be seen by way of the following example. Donald has had his life
repeatedly threatened by violent opponents of his radical political ac-
tivity. Coming out of a political meeting one night, a stranger comes
running toward him in the dark with a shiny object in his hand. Don-
ald shoots and kills. The "knife-wielding" attacker, John, turns out to
be a jogger, armed only with a flashlight.
The death of John, an innocent victim, is a wrong which society
seeks to prevent, not promote. Under the Model Penal Code type of
analysis, if Donald reasonably believed he was under attack by John,
then the deadly force he used to counter the putative attack is "justi-
fied" force, even though there was not actual wrongful aggression. To
determine if Donald gets the benefit of the justification despite this
lack, one must switch gears and move to a level of subjective inquiry
to determine if his mistake was indeed reasonable. To make this de-
termination, one must shift the focus of inquiry from the objective act
to the specific individual actor, Donald. If Donald had defended in
response to an actual knife attack, this inquiry would be superfluous.
One needs only to ask if there was an attack and if the defender re-
sponded with reasonable force and the will to defend himself, because
anyone under the circumstances would have the same right to defend.
A mistake, however reasonable, cannot justify wrongful conduct.
At best, a reasonable mistake provides a basis for excusing Donald's
actions. Donald's erroneous but reasonable interpretation of the situ-
ation which triggered the shooting tells us that perhaps this is not the
kind of act that the law set out to punish. If we cannot blame Donald
for reacting to the deceptive appearance of an attack, then it corre-
sponds with our sense of justice and compassion to excuse his wrong-
ful killing of John.
Consider the consequences to the rights of the victim and third
parties when, as under the self-defense analysis of the Model Penal
Code, an objective element of wrongful aggression is not required for
self-defense. To John and bystanders, Donald's justified defense looks
like, and is, an unprovoked attack. If John sees it coming, one would
certainly expect him to defend himself and one would want to en-
of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04
(1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 (1975).
80. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, supra note 14, at 689-90.
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courage others to intervene to stop the life-threatening attack. Inter-
ference with, or resistance to, Donald's justified force is not allowed,
however, since justified actors have society's stamp of approval. The
implication of labeling Donald's force "justified" is that we strip
others of the right to oppose it, which in the case of putative self-
defense seems an entirely unsatisfactory solution. Were one to give
John an equally compelling right to resist his own death, one would
have justified force battling justified force. That both combatants
could "rightfully" be using deadly force against each other is at best
an awkward result, and at worst a logical impossibility.81
If, on the other hand, Donald were not "justified," but merely
excused for his mistaken belief, then his deadly force against John
would not be rightful and immune from interference, but would con-
stitute wrongful aggression against John. This objective criterion
would trigger John's right to self-defense and allow others to inter-
vene on his behalf.
The unfortunate equation of putative self-defense with actual
self-defense has injected an excuse theory-the reasonableness of mis-
takes-into the determination of justified conduct. Wrongful aggres-
sion then is not the criterion for self-defense; a simple reasonable
belief in wrongful aggression suffices. It seems unlikely that we as a
society really want to justify and encourage mistaken behavior.
Given the murky structure of present law, Schneider cannot be
faulted for attempting to ensure that mistaken women defendants
have every right to present their cases in a manner which substanti-
ates their beliefs as reasonable men who mistakenly defend them-
selves. However, the replacement of objective with subjective factors
in the determination of justified conduct 8 2 has opened the door for
attorneys of battered women to advocate an inquiry into all the pres-
sures and circumstances acting upon the defendant-including every-
thing from previous incidents of violence to whether she suffered from
premenstrual syndrome or alcoholism-in determining whether she
acted in self-defense.8 3
81. For the opposite view, see Greenwald, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and
Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (1984).
82. Schneider, supra note 23, at 640.
83. The confusion about the nature of the battered women's defense is illustrated by two
commentators who go so far as to claim that the defense allows the defendant "the benefit of
the insanity defense without exposing her to the danger of involuntary commitment to a
mental institution for ajustifiable, albeit intentional act." Vaughn & Moore, supra note 45, at
419 (emphasis added).
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It is not too far a leap from a reasonable mistake sufficing for a
justification to the entirely subjective theory of self-defense, advocated
by some commentators for battered women's cases. 84 This paradigm
is the attempt to bring sleeping husband cases under the rubric of self-
defense although there are absolutely no objective criteria of a present
attack. The subjective approach focuses only on the reasonableness of
the woman's belief that killing the abusive spouse was the only way
out of her precarious situation.85
"The key to women's self-defense lies in the definition of what
would be reasonable for a female victim of violence," according to
two commentators8 6 who claim that the most important word in self-
defense is "self. "87 Clearly, if the standard of self-defense were de-
fined by the characteristics of the defendant and viewed from her per-
spective, her act would have to be deemed reasonable.
8 8
"Reasonable" and "right" are not one and the same.89 A justifi-
cation which affects the rights of the victim and third parties calls for
an objective standard of wrongful aggression, not a personal standard
of desperation. Although its proponents are forced by a lack of op-
tions in the United States legal system into peddling it as justified self-
defense, in reality, the battered women's defense simply offers an
excuse.
Killings which occur before or after a beating simply cannot
measure up to a justification standard. Under a strict balancing of
interests test, the life of the batterer is presumed equal to that of the
woman, despite his clearly reprehensible conduct. On the whole, the
batterer's death cannot be considered a reflection of the greater good.
84. Id.
85. "The abused spouse defense... deals with the peculiar facts and background, includ-
ing mistreatment, which make it impossible for her to survive without killing." Id. at 411.
86. Id. at 410 n.5.
87. The SELF in self-defense is a most important word because self-defense is a sub-
jective notion for most people and most people are prone to be subjective, rather than
objective when judging others. Each individual perceives the right to use self-defense
within the framework of his or her own life, standards, experiences, morals,
prejudices, religion, background ....
Id. at 409-10.
88. Creach argues this point, but pushes for a compromise solution of manslaughter,
which I find wholly unacceptable. Under the circumstances of most battered women homicide
cases, a manslaughter conviction would amount to punishing the victim one more time.
Creach, supra note 1.
89. Using self-defense as an example, Fletcher analyzes the differences in styles of legal
thinking represented by the common law's use of "reasonableness" as a standard of conduct as
opposed to the German's emphasis on "right," followed by questions of responsibility.
Fletcher, The Right and The Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949 (1985).
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Unless he is immediately engaged in wrongful aggression, his interests
are not diminished under the common law self-defense standard.
To accept the battered women's defense is to entirely replace the
concept of "imminent attack" with "reasonable belief in a present at-
tack" or even "certainty of a future attack." The difference is sub-
stantial in terms of whether the killing is necessary to protect one's
life. In an imminent attack situation there is no time for detached
reflection or resort to lesser alternatives-the defense must be instan-
taneous. Where an attack is inevitably impending in the future, there
are lesser alternatives which could ameliorate the situation. The wo-
men could leave, go to a women's shelter, or call the police. 90 To
recognize that there are better alternative courses of action than kill-
ing is not synonymous with blaming the women for not taking them.
Because of their lack of finances, dependence, isolation, shame, and
overwhelming fear-in short, because of their victimization-it is en-
tirely understandable why women cannot conceive of, or exercise,
these options. The inability to find another way out does not justify
the killings, it only explains them.
Although the killing of sleeping husbands cannot be justified,
given the historical failure of the legal system to provide women pro-
tection or redress from violent men, we can certainly sympathize with
the plight of a woman trapped in a situation from which she saw no
escape short of killing. The battered women's defense speaks elo-
quently to the question of the blameworthiness of the woman for her
conduct. It explores the dynamics of battering relationships which
explain the woman's perception, fears, and actions. The battered wo-
men's defense requires a shift in focus from the act in the abstract to
the issue of imputing culpability to a particular defendant for a
human response to the overwhelming pressures of a dangerous situa-
tion. To exculpate her for killing in life threatening circumstances,
from which she perceived no means of escape, is very different from
labeling the resulting homicide right and proper.
If it were recognized as a defense in the United States, personal
necessity could excuse the defendant. When the convergence of cir-
cumstances under which the defendant acted exerted sufficient pres-
sure to deprive her of her ability to refrain from the wrongful
90. These options are realistically limited. All 53 women in a 1977 Cook County Jail
study of convicted mate-killers had called the police for protection from their spouses at least
five or six times previous to the date of the homicide. Twenty-seven claimed the beatings
became more severe after each arrest and consequently they stopped calling. MCCORMICK,
BATTERED WOMEN-THE LAST RESORT 8 (1977).
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conduct, then no inference could be drawn from the wrongful act as
to the character of the defendant. 91 Can we blame her for an under-
standable human response to unbearable pressure? Should she be
punished for an action to save herself?
Juries in battered women's cases have begun to do precisely what
the courts have refused, namely, to show compassion for women who
kill in order to save themselves in circumstances in which we could
hardly blame them. In sleeping husband cases where the jury is
presented with the Hobson's choice of conviction or acquittal on justi-
fication grounds, 92 the acquittal amounts to jury nullification of tradi-
tional self-defense requirements. 93 The repeated jury nullification in
battered women's cases clearly signals that something is amiss in our
system of justice. Because we refuse to openly accept the excuse of
personal necessity, we lack an appropriate legal avenue through
which we can express compassion for individuals who succumb to
human weakness and commit wrongful acts under circumstances in
which we would probably do the same. The simple concession to the
weakness of human character involved in the adoption of the defense
of excused necessity would be far less disruptive to our legal system
than jury nullifications which lead to "justifying" the killing of sleep-
ing husbands. 94
Because the Anglo-American system has failed to make a clear
and hierarchical distinction between justification and excuse, the the-
ory under which an acquittal is gained may seem to be of little import
to the freed defendant.95 However, the rights of the victim to resist,
and of third parties to intervene, turn on the characterization of the
act. Acquittals on justification grounds for killings in circumstances
91. The defense is a recognition that the defendant had very little control over the cir-
cumstances in which she was forced to act. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra
note 14, at 801.
92. Although in many cases the conduct of the victim might be sufficient provocation to
reduce the degree of the offense from murder to manslaughter, defense attorneys generally
prefer to force the choice if they have an extremely sympathetic defendant or a plausible claim
of self-defense.
93. Creach, supra note 1, at 626-27.
94. A common result in these cases is that the defendant is convicted and placed on
probation. This is in my opinion also an unacceptable solution, because the woman ends up
branded a murderer. Harriette Davis shot her husband as he slept after a long battering inci-
dent. She was convicted of murder and placed on five years probation in Alameda County,
California. OFF OUR BACKS, Mar. 1983.
95. Although in either case the defendant is freed, there is a difference between being told
"You're not guilty because what you did is the right thing," and "We forgive you for your
wrongful act." Hassemer, Justification and Excuse, supra note 76, at 582.
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where less drastic means were available to ameliorate the situation
highlight the problem.
96
Consider the case of the battered woman acquitted of murder in
the shooting death of her sleeping husband who had threatened to
beat and sexually assault her when he awoke, as he had done during
their marriage numerous times before.97 While the jury's compassion
for the woman's plight was evidenced by an acquittal, the implica-
tions of labeling her conduct "justified" are disturbing. Since justified
conduct is encouraged by society, any third party stranger could have
put the gun to the sleeping man's temple and blown his brains out
with impunity. Had the husband awakened in mid-attack, he would
have had no right to resist his own killing since his wife's conduct was
justified. Under the same rationale, a third person who saw the wife
putting the gun to the head of her sleeping husband would also have
no right to intervene to prevent the killing.
In many cases, these derivative rights and consequences appear
to be wrong and bolster the contention that it is faulty to characterize
the battered women's defense as justified. If the woman's conduct in
this situation were merely excused due to circumstances which de-
prived her of the ability to act otherwise, the defense would be per-
sonal and generate no right for others to engage in the same action.
Similarly anyone, including her husband, could resist or intervene to
prevent the shooting.
While an excuse is highly personal to the defendant, an acquittal
on the basis of a defense of justification creates an exception to the
rules of intentional homicide which affect future cases. 98 It is not sur-
prising that a string of acquittals in similar cases has caused the com-
mentators to decry the battered women's "license to kill." 99 In some
circumstances this has lead to a backlash against women asserting the
defense. 100
96. A young woman was acquitted on self-defense grounds of shooting her unarmed hus-
band who stood several yards away from her, taunting her. Although he had beaten her three
days earlier, he did not touch her on the night of the killing. Commonwealth v. Phillips,
unreported Kentucky Circuit Court case available from the Office for Public Advocacy, State
Office Building Annex, Frankfurt, Kentucky 40601, as reported by Vaughn & Moore, supra
note 45, at 425.
97. See Creach, supra note 1.
98. Certainly women defendants prefer to narrowly focus the court's attention on the
trauma of their personal circumstances rather than factor in the future social impact of an
acquittal on justification grounds.
99. Rittenmeyer, supra note 43, at 393.
100. Psychologist Leonore Walker indicates there are about twenty-five percent fewer ac-
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The introduction into American law of the defense of necessity as
an excuse would resolve the illogical consequences which flow from
the injection of excuse into the theory of justification and offer a vehi-
cle through which juries could express compassion and understanding
of the battered women's desperate actions without condoning the kill-
ings themselves. The German system provides a model of necessary
defenses worthy of note.
V. GERMAN LAW: INTRODUCTION
We begin with a brief overview of the charges that women who
kill their mates are likely to face. We turn then to possible defenses
available in the Strafgesetzbuch (StGB), the German Criminal
Code.' 0 ' The highly conceptual general part of the code sets out a
framework of defenses which clearly differentiates between justifica-
tion and excuse. 0 2 While the structure of the law is clear, hierarchi-
cal, and logical, the actual practice of the courts in limiting the
theoretically unlimited use of force in self-defense (Paragraph 32
Notwehr) has fudged the edges of the scheme and kept legal commen-
tators busy trying to keep the system dogmatically tidy. We will ex-
amine this broader German version of self-defense, how married
women's right to self-defense has been seriously curtailed by judicial
action, and the legal and social consequences of the limitation.
Turning to sleeping husband cases, we analyze the German law
of necessity, which captures both dimensions103 of justification (Para-
graph 34 Rechtfertingender Notstand) 1°4 and excuse (Paragraph 35
quittals now than there were in the past, despite the efforts of psychologists, lawyers and wo-
men's rights advocates. When is Murder Justified?, supra note 3.
101. The newest draft has been in force since January 1, 1975.
102. For a discussion of the differences in American and German legal thinking on crimi-
nal defense theory, see Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, supra note 89; see also
Fletcher, Criminal Theory as an International Discipline: Reflections on the 1984 Freiburg
Workshop, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS 60 (Winter-Spring 1985) [hereinafter Fletcher, Crimi-
nal Theory].
103. Paragraph 54 of the 1871 Criminal Code, "Necessity," provided that there was no
criminal act if the defendant acted in a state of necessity "in order to rescue the actor or one of
his relatives from an imminent, otherwise unavoidable danger to life and limb." STGB 54.
104. Paragraph 34 "Necessity as a Justification" provides that whoever in a situation of
imminent, otherwise unavoidable danger to life, limb, liberty, property or another legal interest
commits an act in order to ward off the danger to himself or to another, does not act wrong-
fully provided that in weighing the conflicting interests, namely, the legal interests involved
and the degree of the dangers threatening them, the interest protected substantially outweighs
the interest impaired. This provision applies, however, only so far as the act is an appropriate
means for warding off the danger. STGB 34.
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Entschuldigender Notstand). 10 5 As in American law, 10 6 Paragraph 34
justifies an actor in circumstances of imminent danger, who, by violat-
ing a statutory prohibition to save a protected legal interest, has cho-
sen the lesser evil. Paragraph 35 requires no strict balancing of
interests and will excuse even persons who act in a state of necessity
and cause a greater harm, but only when the important legal interests
of life, limb and liberty of the actor or a close friend or relative are
endangered. We will review the few cases in which this excuse, which
American courts have refused to accept, has been used to exculpate
actors who kill to end longstanding abuse. 107
Considering the court's newest restriction on women's right to
defend against even attacking spouses, it is not surprising that women
who kill sleeping husbands face an uphill battle in the courts, and
have virtually no chance of having their actions justified. While the
German Criminal Code offers the theoretical possibility of excusing
killings as necessity, very few battered women in recent years have
been able to convince the courts to apply the excuse in their cases.
German courts, like their American counterparts, have preferred to
convict and then mitigate the sentence in those cases where compas-
sion for the defendant is warranted. 08
In the final section, I critique the efforts of one commentator to
include preventative defense as a justifiable necessary defense in Para-
graph 32. I conclude with a brief look at several other legal scholars'
contributions to the search for sound compassionate legal solutions in
the borderline cases of persons who kill to end longstanding tyranny
and in other circumstances of life threatening danger and conflict.
105. Paragraph 35 "Necessity as an Excuse" provides:
(1) Whoever, in a situation of imminent, otherwise unavoidable danger to life, limb
or liberty, commits a wrongful act in order to avert the danger from himself, a rela-
tive or other person close to him, acts without culpability. This provision does not
apply insofar as the actor could fairly be expected under the circumstances-namely
if he caused the danger himself, or if he stands in a special legal relationship-to put
up with the danger; however, the penalty may be mitigated pursuant to Paragraph
49(1) when the perpetrator was not required by the existence of a special legal rela-
tionship to put up with the danger. (2) If in committing the act, the actor mistakenly
assumes the existence of circumstances that would excuse him according to part (1)
of this provision, he is to be punished only if he could have avoided making the
mistake. The punishment should be mitigated according to Paragraph 49(1).
STGB 35.
106. Fletcher, Individualization, supra note 23, at 1287.
107. See infra text accompanying note 215.
108. Many of the sentences are mitigated because of diminished capacity. For example, a
woman who strangled her sleeping husband after twenty-five years of sexual torture and abuse
was convicted of murder and the sentence mitigated to the minimum of three years. Frank-
furter Rundschau, Feb. 28, 1985, at 9; see also infra note 197.
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A. The Killing of Abusive Men
It is impossible to talk about defenses without an introductory
remark about the charges women who kill their husbands are likely to
face. Simply reading the StGB gives one a structure of homicide of-
fenses that could easily lead to false impressions. The case law which
has developed gives an entirely different meaning to the framework.
According to some commentators, sex-specific interpretation by the
courts has led to entirely separate standards of law for women and
men. 109
The interpretation of malice (heimtueck) which, among other
characteristics, distinguishes Paragraph 211 Mord (equivalent to first-
degree murder), from Paragraph 212 Totschlag (equivalent to second-
degree murder), is a prime example. 10 Malice is defined as con-
sciously and willfully exploiting the naivete (un-suspecting of an at-
tack) and defenselessness of the victim. The physical disparity
between women and men combined with sex-role stereotyping in the
court's interpretation of this requirement, has resulted in the excep-
tional cases of women killing men being deemed murder, whereas the
usual killing of women by men is not.
Due to men's physical advantage, most women can only kill
when men are inattentive, and since men do not reckon with an attack
from a woman (naivete), the requirements are fulfilled. The same ad-
vantage allows men to openly attack and kill women, who, con-
versely, can suspect violence from men and hence lack the naivete
which would make the killing malicious. The defenselessness of the
victim must be as a result of the naivete;" ' I the total physical defense-
lessness of most women-even those who can see an attack coming-
is not sufficient exploitation to make a killing malicious." 2
The usual victims of ill treatment-women-would appear to
find some recognition of their dilemma in Paragraph 213. It provides
for substantially lesser penalties for less serious cases of manslaughter
109. Junger, Geschlechtsspezifische Rechtsprechung beim Mordmerkmal Heimtuecke, 2
STREIT: FEMINISTISCHE RECHTSZEITSCHRIFT 35 (1984) [hereinafter Junger]; Burgsmueller,
Anmerkung zum BGH Urteil yom 28. 7. 1983, 7 STRAFVERTEIDIGER 340 (1981); Strobl,
Notwehr=Mord?, EMMA, Feb. 1984, No. 2, at 24-25.
110. In the rule, one who kills a sleeping person, acts with malice. Decision of the
Bundesgerichtshof, Oct. 8, 1969, BGH 23, 119; Hassemer, Die Mordmerkmale, Inbesondere
'Heim tueckisch' und Niedrige Beweggruende, 12 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 626 (1971).
111. Eser, Heim tuecke auf Hoechstrichterlichem Pruefstand: Chance einer Wende in der
Mord-Rechtsprechung, 5 JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAU 177 (1981).
112. Junger, supra note 109, at 41.
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where the actor, through no fault of her own, is driven or provoked
on the spot to kill, as a result of the deceased's mistreatment or seri-
ous insult inflicted on the actor or a relative. Yet in the area of inti-
mate relationships between women and men, it is almost exclusively
men who benefit from the reduced penalty. ' 3 With regularity, men
who kill women with whom they have a relationship are charged
under the less severe dictates of Paragraph 213. Just as regularly, the
dead women have attempted to break out of the relationship and leave
the men. This "provocation" and women's insults and criticism are
sufficient to substantially reduce the severity of the crime for men who
respond by killing.' 14
Paragraph 213, which takes into consideration the wrongful con-
duct of the victim prior to the act would seem more appropriately
applied to battered women's cases. Since few women-however angry
or provoked-are capable of killing on the spot, they rarely benefit
from the reduced charge. The participation of the tyrannical man in
creating the unbearable circumstances which result in his own killing
are treated in a different light and the usual sleeping husband case is
charged as murder. Although court decisions contain full histories of
violent relationships, including a plethora of detailed episodes of beat-
ings and sexual torture, the legal issue is often narrowly focused on
whether the actions of a woman who kills an inattentive tyrant consti-
tutes murder according to the statutory definition. Commentators
have routinely criticized this tendency, since such desperate actions
by abused women and children lack the reprehensibleness which mur-
der-with its mandatory life sentence-represents." 5
B. The Law of Necessary Defense
Notwehr, (Paragraph 32)' 16 which translates as "necessary de-
fense" and operates as a justification, is considerably broader than the
mere right to "self" (life and limb) defense. It includes the right to
protect other legal interests such as property and honor which Anglo-
American lawyers are unaccustomed to thinking of in terms of justi-
113. Geilen, Provokation als Priviligierungsgrund der Toetung? Kritische Betrachtungen zu
213 StGB, DREHER FESTSCHRIFr 357 (1977).
114. Junger, supra note 109, at 40.
115. In extraordinary cases, the BGH has come up with a way to mitigate the mandatory
sentence. See Strafzumessungsloesung, 9/10 STRAFVERTEIDIGER 519 (1981).
116. Paragraph 32 "Necessary Defense" provides: "(1) Whoever commits an act required
as necessary defense, acts not-wrongfully. (2) Necessary defense is the defense necessary to
avert an imminent wrongful attack from oneself or another." STGB 32.
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fled defense. Unlike American law, which treats self-defense as deriv-
ative of the state's power to keep peace when there is no opportunity
to resort to law, German necessary defense is generally viewed as an
inherent natural right of the individual to protect her autonomy and
vindicate her rights. 117
A second underpinning of necessary defense is that every unlaw-
ful attack on personal autonomy is an attack on the entire legal or-
der."i8 Viewed from this perspective, every act of self-defense is a
vindication of the social structure. The objective rightness of protect-
ing society affords third party interveners an independent right to act
on behalf of the victim in attack situations (Nothilfe). 1 9
The threshold act which triggers the defender's justified response
is any "rechtswidrig" attack, roughly translated as unlawful, or con-
trary to right.'20 Yet "rechtswidrig" is more expansive than its Eng-
lish equivalent since it also embodies the notion of attacks by non-
culpable actors, such as children and psychotic aggressors. 12' An ac-
tual attack is required to justify necessary defensive force. Mistakes
about the existence of an attack (putative self-defense) are handled by
an analogous application of Paragraph 16, "Mistake about the Cir-
cumstances of the Act."' 122 A separate provision, Paragraph 33, cov-
ers cases in which the justified defender oversteps the limits of the
defense, since the use of excess force cannot be considered justified
conduct. If the excess is attributable to confusion, fear or alarm aris-
ing out of the attack situation, the defender will be excused.
The "rechtswidrig" requirement of an attack eliminates the appli-
117. Roxin, Sozial-Ethische Einschraenkung des Notwehrrechts, 93 ZEITUNG FUER DIE
GESAMTE STRAFRECHTWISSENSCHAFT 68, 77 (1981) [hereinafter Roxin]. The strongest point
of controversy in the last ten years in German law is the extent of the right to Notwehr and
permissibility of limitations on that right. Various schools of thought depend on which of the
two roots-personal autonomy or defense of the legal order-is emphasized. Maurach &
Heinz, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Teilband I, 6 Aufiage, C. F. Mueller, Heidelberg/Karl-
sruhe, 1983, Para. 26 I, Rn. 1-7, at 335-37.
118. H. JESCHECK, supra note 36, at 270.
119. Id. at 280.
120. Fletcher, The Right and The Reasonable, supra note 89, at 967.
121. Stratenwerth, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil 1, 1981 ACADEMIA JURIS 137 [hereinafter
Stratenwerth]; Fletcher, Proportionality, supra note 14.
122. Paragraph 16 covers cases in which an actor fails to recognize a fact which is an
element of the statutory definition of the crime. In this case the specific intent is lacking and
the liability can only be for an offense for which negligence suffices as the requisite intent.
Although the case of Putativnotwehr is highly debated, the majority view follows the "limited
culpability" theory and applies Paragraph 16 analogously in the case of the erroneous assump-
tion of facts which would support a justified defense. If error was avoidable, the defendant
could be punished for negligence. H. JESCHECK, supra note 36, at 374.
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cability of the defense in situations where the aggressor's acts are
themselves justified. For example, the object of a valid arrest warrant
has no right to resist the assertion of lawful authority. 123 Paragraph
32 characterizes acts committed in necessary defense as not "recht-
swidrig," implying there is no right to resist a justified necessary de-
fense. The text of Paragraph 32 embodies no words of limitation on
the magnitude of allowable immediate defensive force. Unlike Anglo-
American law, where proportionality of force is an inherent concept
since the attacker's interests are included in the societal interests to be
protected, German law demands no such consideration for the at-
tacker. The premise that "Das Recht braucht dem Unrecht nicht zu
weichen" (Right need never yield to wrong), 124 indicates that violators
of the legal order stand outside of, and are unprotected by, the social
order they are transgressing. Any violation of protected rights can be
justifiably countered with any degree of defensive force.
Despite the obvious impracticality of living in a society which
theoretically permits the shooting of petit thieves, 125 parking space
violators, 126 and attacking children, the Germans have been reluctant
to adopt any comprehensive limits on force, since proportionality
runs counter to their basic premise of necessary defense.127 Despite
encouragement from many prominent legal commentators, the legis-
lature passed up the opportunity to comprehensively limit necessary
force in the new 1975 code. Although the law continues to reflect,
virtually unchanged, its 1871 standard of unlimited force, in practice
the use of force has been seriously limited. The limitations have
emerged on an ad hoc basis, 128 as courts and commentators have
carved out a number of areas in which there is consensus for a rule of
proportionality, 129 although the proffered rationales have varied. 130
While most of the so called "social-ethical" limitations are in-
123. Blei, Strafrecht I Allgemeiner Teil, 18 Auflage 152 (1983) [hereinafter Blei].
124. H. JESCHECK, supra note 36, at 269.
125. Decision of Sept. 20, 1920, 55 RGSt 82. This is the classic case in which the shooting
of a thief escaping with stolen apples was held justified.
126. Decision of Jan. 22, 1963 Overlandesgeridcht, Bavaria, NJW 824, (1963). Deadly
force against a parking space violator was considered necessary defense, but not justified since
it represented an abuse of rights.
127. Despite decades of discussion with many commentators urging reform, no rule of
proportionality was enacted in the 1975 revision of the German Criminal Code.
128. Stratenwerth, supra note 121, at 133.
129. The limitations are: 1) the infringement is so slight that members of a society are
reasonably expected to tolerate it; 2) the harm threatened is grossly disproportionate to the
amount of force necessary to prevent it; 3) the defender provoked the attack; 4) the attacker is
a non-culpable actor (child, insane); 5) the parties stand in a close relationship/are married to
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deed desirable in a civilized society, grafting a rule of proportionality
on a system premised on the vindication of "Recht" (right) over "Un-
recht" (wrong) via selective cases has lead to confusion, inconsistency
and illogical results. The most recent limitation by the Bundesger-
ichtshof (BGH), the German Supreme Court, on married persons ' 3'
right to defend against their attacking spouses is illustrative.
C. The Spousal Limitation
In 1969 and 1976, the court upheld the convictions for battery
with deadly consequences 32 of two women who killed their husbands
in self-defense. Although when killed, both men were attacking their
wives-concededly "rechtswidrig"-which should justify any mea-
sure of defensive force, the court ruled that a blow on the head with
an umbrella, 33 and a knife stab to the heart 34 were impermissible
defenses against spouses.
In the second decision which upheld and expanded the rationale
of the first, the BGH opined that the deadly force defense is not per-
missible because married persons 35 share a personal relationship and
are bound together in a close life-sharing manner.136 The one who is
attacked must settle for a milder means of self-defense, even if it only
represents a strong possibility of success, as opposed to complete
certainty. 13
7
Both of the particular assaults which prompted the women's
deadly force defenses, were just two of many which had occurred dur-
ing the marriages. In the first case, "years of experience with her hus-
each other. Courakis, Zur sozialethischen Begruendung der Notwehr, NOMOS VERLAG-
SGESELLSCHAFr (1978).
130. Eser, supra note 15, at 633-34.
131. Although the decisions carefully speak of "spouses," it is women, the usual victims of
violence, who will suffer from this decision.
132. Para. 226 StGB.
133. Decision of Feb. 26, 1969, BGHSt, NJW 802 (1969).
134. Decision of Sept. 25, 1974, BGHSt, NJW 62-63 (1975).
135. The scope of the court's decision is unclear. Marriages which exist only on paper, or
are in the process of being dissolved, embody no close relationship which would warrant a
limitation on the full right of self-defense. Indeed, in the course of divorce, violence often soars
to its highest levels. Similarly, many persons who live together in close bonded relationships
which include care and consideration are not married. See also Marxen, Die Grenzen der
Notwehr bei Auseindersetzungen in der Ehe, 1980 VON NUTZEN UND NACHTEIL DER SOZI-
ALWISSENSCHAFTEN FUER DAS STRAFRECHT 63, 70-71 [hereinafter Marxen, Die Grenzen].
136. The court built off an older case restricting the force allowable between persons in a
close relationship. 1 W. DALLINGER, MONATSCHRIFT FUER DEUTSCHES RECHT 13 (1958).
137. See supra note 134, at 62.
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band's behaviour" and previous "hefty, violent confrontations" were
viewed by the court as grounds for expecting that the wife use lesser
means of self-defense. 138 In assessing the appropriate degree of de-
fense, the court focused on the defendant's marital commitment to
understanding tolerance of their mates and held that the wives should
be expected to endure beatings rather than resort to potentially deadly
means to end them. Only if a husband intended to kill his wife would
deadly force be justified. 13
9
This newest BGH limit on the "unlimited" right to defend one's
personal autonomy has met with both praise 40 and sharp criticism. 141
Advocates of the court's action argue that the limitation on spousal
defense promotes marital harmony and decreases violence within the
family. 1 42 Further, the institution of marriage is protected by the de-
nial of the deadly force defense to spouses. The limitation is legiti-
mized by some commentators who argue that the rationale for
unlimited force is inapplicable within the family setting since marital
disputes do not threaten the social order to the same degree as other
types of attacks. 143
Critics of the court's decision argue that the limitation denies
wives any effective protection from their unarmed husbands since few
women are able to defend themselves without weapons. The court
seems to suggest that the more extensive the pattern of previous vio-
lence, the greater the duty to tolerate further violence, despite the in-
tensification of violence in battering relationships over time. The
implication is that the wife would be in a better position legally if she
kills her husband the first time he attacks. 144 Some commentators
138. Id. at 63.
139. Id.
140. Authors basically accepting the court's limitation, although not necessarily its ration-
ale: Blei, supra note 123, at 151; P. BOCKELMANN, STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TElL 96
(1975); Geilen, supra note 37; Roxin, supra note 117; A. SCHOENKE & H. SCHROEDER,
STRAFGESETZBUCH (1982) [hereinafter A. SCHOENKE & H. SCHROEDER]; H. JESCHECK,
supra note 36, at 278.
141. Kratzsch, Das (Rechts-) Gebot zu sozialer Rucksichtnahme als Grenze des strafrech-
tlichen Notwehrrechts-BGH, NJW 1975, 62, 7 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 435 (1975) [hereinafter
Kratzsch, Das (Rechts-) Gebot]; Zenz, Notwehr unter Ehegatten-psychodynamische Aspekte,
VOM NUTZEN UND NACHTEIL DER SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN FUER DAS STRAFRECHT 77
(1980) [hereinafter Zenz].
142. Are there really happy marriages which need the protection of such a norm? Zenz,
supra note 141, at 79.
143. There is a reduced need for protection of the legal order, but not when it involves
regular beatings. Roxin, supra note 117; A. SCHOENKE & H. SCHROEDER, supra note 140.
144. Geilen, supra note 37, at 316.
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have gone so far as to argue that a wife who has been unable to defend
herself and has been forced to passively endure beatings for years has
a duty to warn her abuser before she engages in a defense against
him!145
The court imposed duty of a wife to tolerate beatings 146 denies
the brutality of domestic violence against women and gives it the im-
primatur of the state. The tacit acceptance by the legal system of
male violence in marital relationships is psychologically devastating
to the victims. It confirms their trapped, helpless feelings and inabil-
ity to turn to social institutions for help and protection. 47 It is incon-
ceivable that the court would ever similarly expect a man to tolerate
daily abuse and beatings, for example, from a co-worker or boss.148
1. Constitutional Objections to the Spousal Limitation
In addition to the serious political and social implications of the
limitations on spousal defense, critics raise a constitutional objection,
which applies equally to all the court's limitations on self-defense.
This judicial action violates the legality principle, "nulla poena sine
lege." Article 103(2) of the Grundgesetz, which functions as the Ger-
man Constitution, and Paragraph 1 StGB express that an act can be
punished only if it was an offense against the law before it was com-
mitted. 149 By limiting married womens' right to self-defense, the
court has criminalized and punished behaviour which had previously
been justified. The BGH has ignored the constitutional issue.
Many commentators support the judicially imposed limitations
on necessary defense. They take a highly restrictive position on the
principle of legality and argue that the constitutional provision is in-
145. Montenbruck, Anmerkung zum Urteil der BGH von 11. 1. 1984, 3 JURISTISCHE
RUNDSCHAU 116 (1985). The BGH's latest spouse self-defense case seems to offer support for
this argument. See infra note 186.
146. Rejecting the duty to tolerate the attack of a spouse, see Geilen, supra note 37, at 317;
Zenz, supra note 142.
147. Vaughn & Moore, supra note 45.
148. The BGH did not expect a teenage boy to endure daily beatings from a schoolmate.
They acquitted the defendant of fatally stabbing the other youth on grounds of self-defense. 41
BGHSt, NJW 2263-64 (1980). In another case in which a battered woman killed her sleeping
mate, the court noted that in addition to kicking the woman in the stomach in an attempt to
abort her suspected pregnancy, the man continued to beat, threaten and insult her "apparently
without reason," implying that there might be a good reason for a man to beat and threaten a
woman. Decision of June 16, 1981, 5 StrR. 143/81, Stragverteidiger, 523, 523-24 (1981).
149. Compare with the Nazi legal thought, "No crime without punishment." H. JEs-
CHECK, supra note 36, at 104.
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applicable to justification grounds.' 50 The constitutional mandate is
satisfied when statutory prohibitions against various forms of assault
and homicide existed at the time of the act in question. Further, these
prohibitions remain intact regardless of whether the court affirms or
rejects a justification.15'
Dietrich Kratzsch has lead the critique of this restrictive ap-
proach, soundly arguing that the "nulla poena sine lege" principle is
violated when the ex post facto judgment of a court limits self-defense
and leaves a defendant subject to criminal punishment for an act
which was privileged at the time it was committed. 152 The ad hoc
judicial limitations on necessary defense are in conflict with basic con-
stitutional rights. Legal order demands that citizens conform their
behavior to the norms of the criminal law. It is the right of citizens to
know what these norms are in order to act accordingly and avoid the
risk of punishment.1 53 Moreover, self-defense rules must be simple
and clear enough to be applied by lay people in emergency
situations. 1
5 4
The legality principle is a rule of fair warning, assuring that per-
sons will be criminally punished only when at the time of their acts
the legal consequences were foreseeable. The freedom of citizens to
act without fear of criminal consequence are protected when the bor-
ders of criminal conduct are exactly formulated and narrowly circum-
scribed. Finally, Kratzsch argues, the legality principle protects a
citizen from later shifts of public opinion and judicially imposed arbi-
trary punishment for acts which were not punishable at the time they
were committed. 55
Although Kratzsch himself approves of the limitations on neces-
sary defense based on social considerations, he acknowledges that it is
the role of the legislature, not the judiciary, to make the law.' 56 The
150. Id. at 276. In favor of a less strict application of the nulla poena sine lege principle is
Claus Roxin. C. ROXIN, KRIMINALPOLITIK UND STRAFRECHTSSYTEM 31 (1983).
151. See H. JESCHECK, supra note 36, at 276.
152. Kratzsch, Paragraph 53 StGB und der Grundsatz nulla crimen sine lege, GOLTDAM-
MER'S ARCHIV 65 [hereinafter Kratzsch, Der Grundsatz]; D. KRATZSCH, GRENZEN DER
STRAFBARKEIT IM NOTWEHR, 30-31 (1968).
153. Kratzsch, Der Grundsatz, supra note 152, at 68; see Robinson, supra note 24, at 272.
154. Hassemer, Die provozierte Provokation oder ueber die Zukunft des Notwehrrechts,
FESTSCHRIFT FUER BOCKELMANN 225 (1979) [hereinafter Hassemer, Provokation].
155. See Kratzsch, Das (Rechts-) Gebot, supra note 141, at 441.
156. Engels, der partielle Ausschluss der Notwehr bei taetlichen Auseinandersetzungen zwis-
chen Ehegatten, 3 GOLTDAMMER'S ARCHIV FUER STRAFRECHT 109 (1982) [hereinafter
Engels].
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legislature, as evidenced by its failure to reform Paragraph 32 in the
last revision of the StGB, seems content to abdicate its authority to
the court to decide the structure of necessary defense. Kratzsch's po-
sition, which has gained considerable support, has prompted his col-
leagues to "solve" the legality problem by finding an existing
statutory basis for the court's limitation on necessary defense.
Various authors have proposed that the limitations are inherent
in the text of Paragraph 32. They argue for restrictive interpretation
of the words "necessary" and "permitted."' 157 Older cases applied a
civil law doctrine pertaining to abuse of rights (Rechtsmisbrauch) to
legitimate the restrictions. 15 8 All these approaches have been criti-
cized as improper interpretation or analogy which also fall within the
scope of, and are forbidden by, the legality principle.15 9
2. The Attempt to Legitimize the Spousal Limitation
In defense of the spousal limitation, the commentators have
taken a different legitimization avenue by anchoring the limitation in
Paragraph 13 StGB, 160 which deals with "commission by omission."
Klaus Marxen, the chief proponent of this approach, argues that a
woman's use of deadly force in necessary defense is a breach of her
duty to protect and care for her husband which arises out of their
close relationship. 16 1 Paragraph 13, which criminalizes certain types
of omissions within the scope of close relationships, provides the ra-
tionale for penalizing the wife's deadly force defense.
The omissions penalized in Paragraph 13 are termed "unechte
Unterlassungsdelikte," which translates roughly as "non-genuine
omission offenses." The characterization of "non-genuine" is used to
distinguish the Paragraph 13 catch-all category of omissions from in-
stances in which the law creates an actual duty and penalizes the mere
failure to comply (echte Unterlassungsdelikte) regardless of a damag-
157. J. BAUMANN & U. WEBER, STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TElL 301-03 (1985); cf
Kratzsch, Der Grundsatz, supra note 152, and Engels, supra note 156.
158. BGH, NJW 308 (1962).
159. See Kratzsch, Der Grundsatz, supra note 152.
160. Paragraph 13, "Commission through Omission" provides:
(1) Whoever omits to avert a result from occurring when that result represents the
element of a definition prohibited by statute, will be subject to punishment pursuant
to this law only if he was legally responsible for preventing the result from occurring,
and if the omission corresponds to the realization of the legal elements of the case by
commission.
STGB 13.
161. K. MARXEN, DIE SOZIALETHISCHEN GRENZEN DER NOTWEHR 27 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter K. MARXEN]; see Geilen, supra note 37; Roxin, supra note 117, at 101.
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ing or harmful consequence. 162 Harm, on the contrary, is the trigger
for liability under Paragraph 13.163 If the omission does not result in
harm, (despite the parent's failure to rescue, the child doesn't drown),
there is no liability' 64 for a completed act, although there may be lia-
bility for attempt. Similarly, the omission must be causal in the sense
that intervention would have prevented the harmful consequences (no
liability if the child would have drowned anyway). 165
Paragraph 13 embodies no test of duty, but merely dictates that
under particular circumstances there is a requirement to act which
has legal, as opposed to moral, compulsion due to the relationship of
the parties. The task of defining the particular circumstances which
trigger legal liability has been left by the lawmakers to the courts, who
must narrow the multitude of potentially liable persons down to those
who have a legal duty to act.
Paragraph 13 liability covers only those parties who are closely
bound to one another in a position of responsibility relative to a par-
ticular risk, termed "Garantenstellung" which makes the actor into a
guarantor that the harm will not occur. 166 While family is the classic
example of a special relationship, the courts have also recognized a
duty in jointly undertaken adventurous projects (mountain climbing,
sailing expeditions) and doctor-patient relationships.'
67
Marxen argues that the wife's position of responsibility vis-a-vis
her husband requires her to relinquish or limit her right to defend
herself from his attacks. This argument is flawed on a number of
levels.
Paragraph 13 is an innovation of the 1975 criminal code which
crystallized in statutory form a century of judicial practice extending
liability for omissions to various classes of guarantors. To the extent
that it was added as a concession to the principle of legality, it fails to
remedy this basic problem. Until the court speaks, it is impossible to
know whether under any particular fact pattern one's failure to act is
tantamount to the commission of a criminal offense. The ad hoc judi-
cial determination of legal duties fails to satisfy the requirements of
fair warning, at least in cases of first impression. Considering Para-
162. Fletcher, Criminal Omissions: Some Perspectives Symposium on the new German
Criminal Code, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 703, 712 (1976) [hereinafter Fletcher, Omissions].
163. Id. at 712.
164. Id. at 713.
165. Id. at 712.
166. Id. at 716.
167. Entscheidung des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen, 21 RGSt 168, at 170.
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graph 13's own legality problems, it is ironic that commentators rely
on it for support to get around the same constitutional objections re-
garding the exclusion of certain self-defense justifications.
Aside from this irony, the concept of a duty to act arising from a
special relationship of the parties, which may in certain circumstances
generate a duty to prevent a particular harm and generate liability for
an omission, has nothing to do with affirmative acts of self-defense.
1 68
The omissions in Paragraph 13 must be the moral equivalent of com-
mitting the harm. To fit within the parameters of Paragraph 13, the
wife's act of self-defense must be viewed as an omission, i.e., a failure
to act to prevent the harm, which is equated with an act causing
harm. In other words, by defending herself with deadly force, the
wife violates her duty to protect her husband from the harm caused
by her own self-defense. In addition to being circular, this approach
to criminal liability fails to reflect the concepts of justice and support
of the legal order which have characterized previous cases in which
the courts recognized a legal duty to act.
Two decisions within the family circle line of cases are worthy of
note. In separate cases a wife who failed to intervene when she saw
her husband in the act of committing suicide, 69 and a son who failed
to prevent or warn his father of a plan for the father's murder 70 were
both held accountable for the resulting deaths. The courts opined
that the close relationship generated a responsibility to act, the breach
of which was the moral equivalent of bringing about the harmful
consequence.
While marriage certainly embraces both moral and legal' 7 ' duties
of consideration and protection, the rationale of the above cases is ill-
168. Marxen argues unpersuasively to the contrary, and relies for support on crimes in the
specific part of the code for which the guarantor principle has intrinsic meaning. His reason-
ing is flawed on two levels: his enumeration of StGB paragraphs (ex. 174, 203, 221, 223)
clearly show that when the legislature wants to make an act criminal because of a certain
relationship between victim and actor, they know how to write it to satisfy the legality princi-
ple. Secondly, in the examples he gives, the stronger party has no duty to actively protect the
weaker party, but must only refrain from exploiting the power advantage implicit in their
relationship. K. MARXEN, supra note 161.
169. Decision of Feb. 12, 1952, 2 BGHSt 150.
170. Decision of Nov. 29, 1963, 19 BGHSt 167. Recently a forty-five year old homemaker
from Eschau was sentenced to life imprisonment for failing to intervene as her 19 year old son
shot and killed her abusive husband, who had terrorized the family for years. The State Court
in Aschaffenburg also sentenced the son to four years under juvenile law for murder and the
woman's stepfather who had financed the gun's acquisition to 13 years. EMMA, Jan. 1986, at
9.
171. The German Civil Code, Buergeliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) Paragraph 1353, Section II.
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fitting when one guarantor attacks the other. The duty invoked in
previous guarantor cases required one party to protect the other from
a harm external to the relationship, for example, a self-imposed in-
jury, murder by a third party, the consequences of a mountain slide, a
shipwreck, or a fatal disease. While the court might reasonably re-
quire a mountain climber to assist her clinging partner to safety after
a dangerous fall, it does not follow that they would also limit a
climber's right to self-defense when attacked by a fellow mountaineer.
It is equally unlikely that a doctor would be required to tolerate a
beating from her patient.1
72
In these examples, no limitation on the forcefulness of the de-
fense would arise from the nature of the particular relationship be-
cause force and aggression are beyond the scope of the bond, 173 The
same should follow for the marriage relationship: a commitment to
share a life together binds two people, each to protect the other from
harm threatened by any force external to the relationship. Marriage
embodies neither a license to beat nor the assumption of the risk of
the other's violent conduct.
It is unfair to use the marital bond to put the victim in the role of
protecting the attacker.174 The marriage relationship embodies mu-
tual duties and, by repeatedly assaulting their wives, men certainly
disregard their duty to protect their mates from harm. 175 Because of
the close bond and mutual dependence of married people, an assault
by one against the other is all the more insidious since it is also a
breach of the fundamental trust relationship. While taking precau-
tions against assaults by strangers, people in close relationships let
down their guard with those they trust and are extremely vulnerable
to attacks by their "protectors."'
' 76
The StGB recognizes this principle in Paragraph 223 II (higher
172. For the view that "Garantenstellung" has no application to the self-defense situation
of spouses, see Engels, supra note 156, at 113.
173. Roxin would strictly limit the scope of self-defense not only in a "Lebenskreis" as the
BGH opined, but in all "Garantenstellnugen" in the sense of Paragraph 13. Roxin, supra note
117, at 101-02.
174. The husband's blameworthiness isn't any less because of his marital status; the wife's
should not be any greater because of hers. Deubner, Urteilsanmerkung zu BGH, 18 NJW 1184
(1969).
175. The BGH failed to mention in either case the marriage regulating paragraph of the
German Civil Code (BGB). One partner is freed from the marital duty of consideration when
the other commits a severe violation of his duty, including physical abuse. Kratzsch, Das
(Rechts-) Gebot, supra note 141, at 436.
176. Between two and four thousand women are beaten to death by lovers or husbands
every year. Shattering Domestic Violence, supra note 5, at 10.
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penalty for assault on family members) and Paragraph 46 II (the se-
verity of the violation of duty is reflected in the degree of punish-
ment). Similarly, if one party violates his duty and attacks the one he
is supposed to be protecting, the self-defense right should not be lim-
ited because of the social relationship, but should be exercised to the
fullest degree for the protection of the victim.
177
In any case, the responsibilities created by a special relationship
such as marriage are not absolute, but can be negated by superior
social interests such as lawful public authority or necessary defense.
A wife could not intervene to prevent the harm of a lawful arrest or to
stop another person from defending himself against the husband's
wrongful aggression. In all but the marital violence situations, the
legal order abrogates the wife's duty to protect her husband where he
is a wrongful aggressor. By his actions the husband places himself
outside the protection of the legal order and any individual is justified
in using force to defend against him. It is absurd to insist that,
although in the status of outlaw to the entire society, he remains in
the good graces of his wife-particularly when she is the one he
attacks!1
78
In addition to the devastating impact of the necessary defense
limitation on women, 179 the rights of third parties to intervene are
also affected. Can a stranger use deadly force to stop a husband from
beating his wife when she herself is not justified in using such force?
Unlike in many American jurisdictions where the actor steps in the
victim's shoes and acquires only the same (here limited) right to de-
fend, the German institution of "Nothilfe," necessary defense assist-
ance, is not derivative.
Paragraph 32 specifically generates a right to ward off an unlaw-
177. Marxen, echoing the BGH's opinion, argues in the opposite direction: when a special
relationship exists between the parties which requires mutual consideration, the one attacked
cannot just fight off the other with the same unlimited force as if they were any attacker.
Rather, because of the relationship, the victim must take care not to harm the aggressor. The
father/son example he uses to support his argument is inapplicable to the situation between
husband and wife in a patriarchal society. K. MARXEN, supra note 161, at 42-43.
178. Another example of the institution of marriage having priority over women's per-
sonal autonomy is seen in the spousal exclusion of Paragraph 177 StGB, the rape provision.
The decisions of the BGH would appear to limit a wife's defense against rape to non-deadly
force, unless her husband also meant to kill her. Compare the Model Penal Code, where,
although the rape provision, Section 213.1(1) contains a spousal exclusion, there is no such
limitation in the definition of sexual intercourse in Section 213.0(3). The self-defense provision
of the Model Penal Code allows deadly force to defend against forced sexual activity.
179. For a discussion of the increased vulnerability of women to the violence of their hus-
bands as a result of the BGH's limitation on self-defense, see Geilen, supra note 37.
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ful attack from "one's self or another." This provision accords with
the German theory that an attack against a protected legal interest is
an attack against the entire legal order. It affords an independent
right to third parties to defend and uphold the interests of society.18 0
Hence, the shooting of a wife-beating husband by a stranger falls
within the parameters of justified defense. This analysis leads to the
illogical yet inescapable conclusion that a wife's use of deadly force
against her husband in her own defense could lead to criminal prose-
cution, whereas a stranger's defense of her would be justified.11
According to the court's spousal limitation on necessary defense,
a wife who uses deadly force to stop her husband's unarmed beating
will only be justified if on that particular occasion he intended to kill
her. If a wife responds to an assault with what the court considers to
be excessive defensive force, the provisions of Paragraph 33 might
come into play to relieve her of criminal liability. Paragraph 33 pre-
cludes punishment for excessive force in necessary defense if the actor
exceeds the limits of necessary force when acting out of confusion,
fear, or alarm, if the mistake about the extent of the force necessary in
response to an attack is based upon an unavoidable misconception of
the severity and strength of the attack. 1 8 2 Thus, the actor's conduct is
wrongful, but the actor is excused.
If the wife's use of force exceeds the limits imposed by the court,
the defense would be wrongful vis-a-vis her husband, generating a
right for him to necessary defense against her wrongful aggression.
Although justified, his defense would be limited by his own status as a
provocateur.18 3 The third party is justified in using deadly force to
defend the wife unless, and until, the wife uses deadly force on her
own behalf. This uncertainty may lead to an even greater hesitancy
on the part of strangers to intervene in "domestic affairs."' 8 4
180. Eser, supra note 15, at 632.
181. Were the helper also to be limited in his defense to the same extent as the wife, he
would have to ask, "Are you married?" before intervening to defend a woman being beaten. If
he defended without asking, he would probably have an excuse for mistakenly assuming she
was a normal person entitled to defend herself; very little has been written about the effect of
the necessary defense limitations on third parties who assist in a defense (Nothilfe). See Seel-
mann, Grenzen Privater Nothilfe, ZEITSCHRIFT FUER DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSEN-
SCHAFT 36-60 (1977). It is an open question whether a wife could justifiably intervene on the
victim's behalf with deadly force against her husband if he was beating a third party.
182. Although the provision is not labeled, it is treated as an excuse.
183. Since he created the dangerous situation, he must now attempt to avoid, ward off, or
endure her reaction.
184. Three psychologists from Michigan State University staged a series of fights to ob-
serve the reaction of bystanders. Men came to the assistance of male victims attacked by either
[Vol. 10: 1
Battered Women, Dead Husbands
3. Retreat from the Limitation on Necessary Defense for Spouses?
The latest decision by the BGH185 involving a self-defense knife
killing of an attacking husband expressly left open the question of
whether the right to necessary defense between spouses is actually
limited or not. Although the court overturned the conviction of the
wife, it did so without specifically rejecting its previous necessary de-
fense decisions regarding spouses.
In the newest case, the court appeared to rely for support on the
fact pattern itself. The husband, a drug user who had previously
taken some of his wife's savings, returned home to take the rest. To
prevent him from leaving the apartment the wife locked the door and
put the key in her pocket. As the husband hit and kicked her, a male
friend unsuccessfully tried to cool down the fight, then gave up and
went into another room. As the husband renewed his aggression, the
woman picked up a knife and threatened to use it. When her husband
attacked again, she struck him once in the heart. That the woman
was pregnant at the time of the attack and lost the baby a few days
later, appears to have been the actual grounds for the court's opinion
in this case, since it carefully expresses its decision in terms of "preg-
nant women." 186
The court went on to clarify several important issues. The BGH
declared that a woman's right to defense is not limited simply because
on previous occasions she had not suffered severe injuries from her
husband's beating. The court also recognized, in direct contrast to its
earlier decisions, that aiming a slash at the attacker's arms is a diffi-
cult task to demand in a self-defense situation and could in fact infuri-
ate the attacker and increase the intensity of the attack. The first
BGH spouse's self-defense decisions demanded that in all cases the
wife must first use the deadly weapon in a non-lifethreatening manner
against the extremities. Although the newest decision was carefully
limited, it did spark hope that the BGH is responding to its critics and
slowly backing away from its initial hardline limitation on necessary
defense for spouses.
Having seen the court's limitation on women's rights to defend
against attacking spouses, we turn to the cases in which there is no
a man or a woman; they helped a woman attacked by another woman, but not one single man
intervened when a man attacked a woman. (Straus 1976, at 177) reported in Metz-Goeckel,
supra note 51, at 416.
185. Decision of Jan. 11, 1984, BGHSt, 17 NJW 986 (1984).
186. Id. at 986.
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present attack, the sleeping husband cases. Several theories have been
offered by legal scholars to acquit women for killing in these ex-
traordinary situations. We begin with a look at the leading defense of
excused necessity contained in Paragraph 34 StGB.
D. Excused Necessity
The Germans have developed a full range of excuses which rec-
ognize the frailties of human character and leave unpunished actors
whose violation of the law cannot be viewed as entirely voluntary.
When the defendant's actions are so clearly dictated by overwhelming
circumstances that it cannot be fairly expected of her to refrain from
the wrongful conduct, then she acts blamelessly. The German con-
cept of Zumutbarkeit, a notion of imputability, captures this dimen-
sion of compassion. If a person cannot be fairly expected to conform
her behavior to the dictates of the criminal law, as when she kills in a
necessity situation out of self-survival instincts, her conduct lacks the
personal reproachability required for punishment.
The concept of Zumutbarkeit is the basis of Paragraph 35 "Ex-
cused Necessity,' 8 7 which excuses an actor who commits unlawful
acts in order to save herself, a relative, or close friend from a present
danger to life, limb, or freedom which is otherwise unavoidable. The
second clause of the paragraph expresses the other aspect of
Zumutbarkeit, namely, those cases in which the actor can be fairly
expected to put up with the danger, either because she caused it, or
because she has a legal duty to assume a higher risk of danger, as in
the case of fire fighters or police officers.
In contrast to justified necessary defense, where all legal interests
are protectable, only a threat of the most important legal interests
support the underlying contention of the excuse-that the defendant
could not help but to act in their defense. The excused necessity actor
is not furthering the greater good, but rather selfishly protecting her
own interests at the expense of the interests of others. While the "in-
voluntariness" of the defender's conduct is a function of the value of
the competing interests, the interest the defender saves may well be
lesser than or equal to the interest harmed. The unusual circum-
stances of a danger to life, limb or freedom do not foreclose the ability
of the actor to act in accordance with the law, but they do make it
unlikely that she will do so. The question is whether under the cir-
cumstances the defender can be blamed for acting as she did.
187. See supra note 105.
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By its terms, excused necessity is available as a defense only to
the endangered person, and a circumscribed circle of family and
friends. There is no allowable supportive role for detached third par-
ties, whose participation lacks the compulsion of those whose interests
are immediately affected. Actions committed in necessity, though ex-
cused, are wrongful transgressions of legally protected interests and
fulfill the elements of statutorily prohibited conduct. Supporters
would be liable for prosecution as accessories.
Although excused, the actions of the necessity actor constitute
wrongful aggression against the victim. The wrongful attack sparks a
right under Paragraph 32 for the victim to respond in justified neces-
sary defense. Under the same paragraph, anyone who intervenes on
behalf of the victim is justified (Nothilfe).
While jealously guarding the strict temporal restrictions of "pres-
ent" attack in justified necessary defense, beginning in the 1920's the
courts have expansively defined the "present" danger required to ex-
cuse one acting in necessity. Despite criticism of its irreconcilable in-
terpretations of "present," the courts have periodically reaffirmed
their initial position regarding necessity and continue to offer the pos-
sibility of excusing actors who end longstanding victimization by kill-
ing their oppressors.
As early as 1926, the Reichsgericht declared that the killing of a
non-attacking tyrannical father was an act of necessity. 188 The court
upheld the acquittal of a young man for fatally shooting his father in
order to protect his mother and sister from continuous violence and
abuse. The last incidence of violence had occurred 20 hours prior to
the killing.
The court made several important clarifications about necessity,
then Paragraph 54.189 First, that not just natural forces, but also the
culpable behavior of a person could produce a necessity situation. 190
Secondly, ongoing, threatening circumstances could create a present
necessity danger. The court declared that the killing of a person who
presented a lasting danger could be viewed as acting in necessity, even
if at the time of the killing the victim was not engaged in, or threaten-
ing, imminent violent behavior. 19 1
188. Decision of July 12, 1926, 60 RGSt 318.
189. See supra note 103.
190. The new formulation of the law has collapsed both situations of duress and necessity
into the single excuse in Paragraph 35.
191. Decision of Jan. 23, 1925, 59 RGSt 69.
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The court built on an earlier decision in which the defendant was
acquitted for burning down her badly deteriorated house after re-
peated attempts to persuade the housing authority to give her a better
living situation were ignored. Both cases are significant in that the
court declared ongoing circumstances to be sufficient to create a pres-
ent necessity. Just as striking, however, is that the court upheld such
drastic actions as killing and arson without questioning the availabil-
ity or suitability of lesser means to avert danger.
92
In 1966 the BGH adopted the Reichsgericht interpretation
which holds that in certain situations, necessity justifies violent ac-
tions by family members who are threatened by dangerous husbands
or fathers. The BGH recognized that where the police have been
called in the past and have failed to intervene energetically enough
against a tyrannical father/husband who is dangerous, and whose in-
humane behavior was known to them, the lack of official help could
create a necessity situation for the threatened family members. 193 A
fifteen year old girl hit her stepfather from behind with a frying pan,
and as she went to get the police, he was again struck in the head by
the mother. The girl was convicted of murder in juvenile court; the
mother for manslaughter as a result of the step-father's ensuing death.
The girl's conviction was reversed on other grounds but the court
pointed out that in the event of a new trial, the lower court should
carefully consider two factors. First, the court should consider
whether the family members were in a situation of necessity, and sec-
ond, the court should question whether the young girl could be ex-
cused for her actions because the lesser available means-appeals to
her weak, oppressed mother, as well as to the police authorities-had
proved useless. The court further noted that the trial court had erred
in numbering among the lesser alternatives available to the mother
(who did not appeal) that she procure a divorce or commit her hus-
band to an institution because of his alcoholism. The mother could
not be expected to endure the inhumane behavior of her husband until
sometime in the future when and if the action had success. The court
192. The availability of lesser means was precisely the reason the claim of necessity of a
woman who killed her tyrannical husband with an axe as he lay in bed was rejected in 1949 by
the Supreme Court for the postwar British zone. While in theory accepting the reasoning of
the previous cases, the court refused its application to the case at hand, noting that the defend-
ant could have avoided her husband by staying in another room, leaving the house, or calling
the police as she had done on previous occasions. Decision of Mar. 15, 1949, OBERSTEN GER-
ICHTSHOF FUER DIE BRITISCHE ZONE IN STRAFSACHEN 369 (1949).
193. BGH, NJW 1823 (1966).
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concluded that necessity excuses even drastic acts of a person which
save their own and their family member's lives and limbs if the danger
cannot be overcome immediately and finally in other ways.
194
In 1979, the BGH gave its most recent approval to the concept of
"lasting danger" which triggers necessity. It reversed convictions for
assault and weapons law violations of a man who shot a fleeing
empty-handed intruder after his home's seventh night burglary in
roughly seven months. 195 Burglar alarms, the police and warning
shots had all failed to prevent reoccurrences of the break-ins. The
court noted that when ongoing danger is so pressing that at any time
it can produce damage, even if there is a time gap between the damag-
ing occurrences, a necessity situation is created.196 The court held
that a lasting danger is a unified entity and cannot be divided into
present and future parts. 197
However sparingly the courts have applied Paragraph 35 to ex-
cuse victimized family members who kill, this solution is accepted by
the vast majority of commentators and jurists as the appropriate legal
response to a tragic situation. The victim and interveners are pro-
tected in their right to resist, and the killing is deplored, but the killer
is compassionately excused.
Despite the well established distinction between wrongfulness
and blame in German law, battered women's homicide cases represent
the difficulty in drawing the fine line between right and wrong con-
duct. Unsatisfied with merely excusing battered family members,
some commentators urge justifying their acts instead. In many cases
both factors of diminished wrongfulness and diminished culpability
combine to make neither a justification nor an excuse a totally desira-
ble or satisfactory result. The next section will examine briefly several
competing theories which attempt to establish the line of justification
to include battered women's killings, or which offer new schemes to
194. Id. at 1824.
195. BGH, NJW 2053 (1979).
196. Hassemer, Notstandslage bei Dauergefahr, I JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 69 (1980)
[hereinafter Hassemer, Notstand].
197. This has not stopped the commentators from noting the similarity between ending a
lasting danger and preventative defense, a concept which has generally been rejected within the
confines of Paragraph 32. For a discussion of this defense, see infra note 198. Hruschka would
solve this case with an extra-statutory defensive necessity justification analogous to Paragraph
228 BGB. Hruschka, Rechtsfertigung oder Entschuldigung im Defensivnotstand?, 1/2 NJW
21-23 (1980) [hereinafter Hruschka, Defensivnotstand]. For a discussion of this defense, see
infra note 214.
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deal with conduct which falls within the gray area between right and
wrong.
E. Justification: Lack of Criminal Wrongfulness,
or Lack of Responsibility?
The right to Paragraph 32 necessary defense is sparked by a pres-
ent wrongful attack (gegenwaertiger rechswidriger Angriff). "Pres-
ent" in this context means actual or imminent, specifically, that any
hesitation on the part of the victim would substantially decrease her
ability to defend.198 When the danger to the protected legal interest is
long-term rather than instantaneous, as in the case of ongoing domes-
tic violence, a "notwehraehnliche Lage"'199 results, that is, a situation
similar to those which generate a right to necessary defense. The clas-
sic and most debated case is blackmail, where the threat to honor-a
legal interest capable of necessary defense protection-is ongoing and
capable of erupting into harm at any moment.
2°°
The question is whether and when such a threat fulfills the re-
quirements of "present attack" in the sense of Paragraph 32 which
would justify unlimited force in necessary defense against the black-
mailer. The commentators who have addressed the issue generally
feel that some sort of defensive action short of killing may be justified.
This includes making a secret tape recording, or in some cases even
robbery or burglary to retrieve incriminating evidence in the hands of
the blackmailer. The discussion has been kept alive by occasional ref-
erences by the BGH in civil matters that the illegal secret tape record-
ing of conversations to protect other interests may be justified. 20 1
The concept of a distinct justification ground for preventative
necessary defense has been rejected by many scholars who, while jus-
tifying some types of preventative action, prefer to see these situations
regulated by Paragraph 34 "Justified Necessity." Paragraph 34 is fa-
vored for its stricter weighing of interests requirement. 20 2 Since the
interests protected in justified necessity must "substantially outweigh"
198. See supra note 196.
199. H. SUPPERT, STUDIEN ZUR NOTWEHR UND NOTWEHRAEHNLICHEN LAGE 368
(1973).
200. Haug, Notwehr Gegen Erpressung, 7 MONSCHRIFT FUR DEUTSCHES RECHT 548
(1964); H. WELZEL, DAS DEUTSCHE STRAFRECHT 87 (1969).
201. Decision of Feb. 21, 1964, 19 BGHSt 325, 332; Decision of June 14, 1960, 14 BGHSt
358, 361.
202. A. SCHOENKE & H. SCHROEDER, supra note 140, Par. 34, Rdnr. 30-31; Roxin, Die
Notstandaehnliche Lage-ein Strafunrechtsauss chliessungsgrund?, FEsTSCHRIFT FUER DIE-
TRICH OEHLER 181 (1985) [hereinafter Roxin, Notstand]; Schaffstein, Der Masstab fuer das
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the interests infringed upon by the defense, killing is not among the
actions which could be justified.
Hartmut Suppert, 20 3 the leading advocate of preventative neces-
sary defense, believes even killing, under certain circumstances, is jus-
tifiable. He proposes the extension by statute of Paragraph 32 to
include preventative defense for situations of ongoing violence where
a threat of future violence exists. In support of his argument, he relies
on the case of a young boy excused by the Reichsgericht in 1926 who
shot his tyrannical father as he lay in bed playing with the dog in
order to protect the family from further violence.20 4
Merely excusing "wrongful" behavior is not a satisfactory solu-
tion for Suppert, who, preferring to solve the case at the justification
level of legal analysis20 5 denies any wrongfulness in the survival ac-
tions of tyrannized family members. The advantages he sees as treat-
ing such cases as preventative necessary defense as opposed to
excused necessity are threefold: the legal interests capable of being
defended are greater in necessary defense (all legal interests) than in
excused necessity (only life, limb and liberty); the victim has no right
to resist, nor can anyone lawfully aid the victim; preventative neces-
sary defense would justify all third party helpers who assist in the
killing, whereas necessity excuses only the battered party, her imme-
diate family and close friends, leaving others liable for prosecution as
accessories.
In order to reach this result, Suppert urges that the expanded
definition of "present" in "present danger" in excused necessity-the
solution to the tyrannical father case reached by the Reichsgericht-
be carried over to expand "present attack" in necessary defense to
include ongoing violent situations and concrete threats of future
harm.20 6 To the contrary, the courts and commentators have seen
from early on a clear distinction between "present danger," which can
Gefahrurteil beim rechtfertigenden Notstand, 1978 FESTSCHRIFT FUER HANS-JUERGEN BRUNS
89.
203. H. SUPPERT, supra note 199, at 368-87.
204. See supra note 188.
205. The German system of analysis of a criminal act (Straftatsystem) proceeds in the
following manner: 1. was there a human act? (Handlung), 2. did it fulfill the definition of a
criminal statute? (Tatbestandsmassigkeit), 3. is it justified? (Unrecht), 4. is the actor excused?
(Schuld), 5. are there any personal reasons to forego or exclude punishment? (Strafaufhebungs-
und Strafausschliessungsgruende). The system is heirarchical; each level presupposes the pre-
vious ones. See W. NAUCKE, STRAFRECHT: EINE EINFUEHRUNG 219 (1977); W. HASSEMIER,
EINFUEHRUNG IN DIE GRUNDLAGEN DES STRAFRECHTS 188 (1981).
206. H. SUPPERT, supra note 199, at 379.
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include an ongoing dangerous situation capable of erupting into harm
at any time and the instantaneous moment of "present attack" where
the defender is forced to react with the same speed to protect her-
self.20 7 Suppert's critics maintain that the sleeping tyrant is neither
attacking, nor-because he has threatened to attack-attacking
"analogously." 208
Suppert argues that the victim should have no right to resist his
own death because the legal system should stand fully on the side of
RIGHT (the actor who seeks to free himself from oppressive circum-
stances) rather than with the victim, who threatens to effectuate his
illegal intentions. The tyrannical victim loses his right to resist not
only against those he tyrannized, but against all those friends, neigh-
bors and strangers who assist the abused woman in the justified kill-
ing. Suppert applauds this result as well as the extension of a privilege
to all third parties who help in the killing.
Desperate actions which society may be willing to tolerate from
the immediate victims of long term abuse lose their tolerable charac-
ter when done by someone unconnected with the personal tragedy. A
killing in self-preservation by a terrorized women has an entirely dif-
ferent quality than a killing done by a postman who just wants to help
out. If society condones the killing as right and proper, it should not
make a difference if the battered woman, the postman, or a visiting
social worker from the battered woman's shelter pulls the trigger.
The same is true if there were a present attack on the wife which
would justify immediate defense; it would not matter.
Both necessary defense and necessity are part of the law of emer-
207. As recently as 1983, the BGH reversed the murder conviction of a woman who used
a mallet to bash in her sleeping husband's head to end the years of tyranny and abuse she and
her son had faced, and to ward off a threatened attack on her son. Given the woman's oppres-
sive circumstances, the trial court had not clearly enough grounded its verdict against her.
Specifically, the BGH directed the trial court to examine the factual prerequisites for murder
and carefully consider justified necessary defense and excused necessity as well as the possibil-
ity that the defendant had erred over the circumstances which are preconditions for these
defenses, in which case the degree of offense could be lowered from intentional to negligent or
the punishment mitigated. BGH Decision of Aug. 2, 1983. 5 StR. 503/83. 11
STRAFVERTEIDIGER 458 (1983).
What is interesting about this case is that the BGH considered necessary defense worthy
of discussion, let alone careful consideration. Given the factual background-previous abuse
combined with the threat of future harm-combined with the lack of a present attack at the
moment the sleeping man was killed, leads to the conclusion that a preventative necessary
defense situation is implied or at least not totally excluded. On retrial the woman was con-
victed of manslaughter and sentenced to two years probation. EMMA, Apr. 1985, at 7.
208. T. Hillenkamp, VORSATZ-OPFERVERHALTEN 113, 117 (1981).
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gency situations. An act justified or excused in an emergency can lose
its privileged/excused character when timely help arrives and the
danger is abated. 209 The isolation of the woman and her inability to
seek the help of others are factors producing the necessity which may
excuse killing. The very presence of detached third persons prepared
to offer help to the woman, should substantially ameliorate the crisis
situation which could, under Suppert's analysis, justify a killing in
preventive necessary defense.
Although Suppert's preventive necessary defense solution for this
group of cases has been rejected by most commentators as being too
broad and drastic,210 the points he raises are not so lightly dismissed.
While it is the tragic personal quality of these hopeless situations
which causes us to seek an acceptable legal solution for trapped fam-
ily members forced to kill to survive, to speak only of their lack of
culpability for wrongdoing (as in the prevailing theory of excused ne-
cessity) doesn't seem to do complete justice to the situation. Because
of the similarity to a self-defense situation, the wrongful character of
the act itself is substantially diminished. The diminished wrongful-
ness is the reason some commentators favor excusing the woman. 21
Yet if we are to reproach the woman for acting wrongfully, then
we must be prepared to answer the question, what in this situation is
right? A legal system which has turned its back on the plight of
abused family members, yet stands prepared in full measure to vindi-
cate the rights of the dead oppressor has, at best, skewed priorities. In
a true life versus life dilemma with no way out for the woman but
killing, to argue hypothetical options (calling unresponsive police; go-
ing to non-existent shelters; leaving home with children to care for, no
money, and no place to go) is about as persuasive as saying that the
famous Karneadis' plank problem-two shipwreck survivors strug-
gling over a board capable of supporting only one of them-could
best be solved by a rescuing ship. 212
However, no lesser solution seems completely adequate. The
shipwrecked sailors' struggle to survive illustrates the difficulty of line
209. Hassemer, Justification and Excuse, supra note 76, at 607.
210. Roxin, supra note 117; H. JESCHECK, supra note 36, at 275; A. SCHOENKE & H.
SCHROEDER, supra note 140, Par. 32, Anm. 17.
211. Eser, supra note 15, at 636.
212. For a discussion of this famous hypothetical of the Greek philosopher Karneades
(214-129 B.C.), which has plagued legal scholars for years, see Kaufmann, Rechtsfreier Raum
und eigenverantwortliche Entscheidung usw, FESTSCHRIFT FUER REINHART MAURACH 327,
327-29 (1972) [hereinafter Kaufmann].
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drawing and labeling. Except in the case of self-defense, when life is
pitted against life in a competition for survival, the law takes a posi-
tion of neutrality. Human lives cannot be simply weighed against
each other. Every life is unique and presumptively of equal value re-
gardless of age, sex, health, social status, or moral worth. When two
lives hang equally in the balance, society reaps no benefit in saving
one at the expense of the other. There can be no justification on a
lesser evils theory. Yet excusing the surviving sailor on a theory of
excused necessity means conceding that his survival actions were
wrongful. 2
13
The life versus life dilemma of battered women and their hus-
bands has another dimension. Namely, the responsibility for creating
the life threatening situations lie with the abusive men who brutally
tyrannize their wives. This responsibility factors into the justification
analysis of the women's actions in a competing theory offered by Joa-
chim Hruschka. He reaches a solution similar to Suppert's by means
of an extrastatutory justification analogous to Paragraph 228 of the
German Civil Code.
2 14
This Paragraph, termed defensive necessity, justifies the destruc-
tion of objects when a risk to the actor emanates from the object itself,
and the harm caused by destroying the dangerous object is not too
disproportionate to the harm avoided. The Paragraph would justify
the shooting of a vicious attacking dog, or the bombing of a beached
tanker when the leaking oil threatened to destroy a bathing beach in
the area.21
5
Hruschka wants the defensive necessity privilege applied not
only to objects but also to persons, in the same way that the Reich-
sgericht in the tyrannical father case recognized that persons can be a
source of danger. Hruschka contends defensive necessity is needed to
213. While this is the prevailing solution, it is not without its theoretical problems, includ-
ing giving each the right to justified necessary defense against the other, a non-sequitor in
German legal thought. Id. at 328. No excuse of necessity would be available, however, if the
prevailing sailor had himself caused the necessity situation, by, for example, causing the ship-
wreck to settle a grudge against the owner. Paragraph 35 denies the excuse to actors who
should be fairly expected to put up with the danger since they caused it themselves, or because
they stand in a particular legal relation to the danger (for example, firefighters). This condition
does not weaken the premise that both lives are of equal value, it simply makes the killing of
one at the expense of the other punishable when the survivor by his actions or omissions
caused the necessity or had a particular duty to assume a higher degree of danger.
214. Hruschka, Extrasystematische Rechtfertigungsgruende, 1977 FESTSCHRIFT FUER
DREHER 189, 203-06 [hereinafter Hruschka, Rechtfertigungsgruende]; Hruschka, Defensivnot-
stand, supra note 198.
215. H. JESCHECK, supra note 36, at 285.
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fill the gap left by Paragraph 34 of the German Criminal Code, which
could never justify the killing of even a dangerous person because the
interests of one person cannot be seen as having "substantially"
greater value than those of another, as required by the statute.21 6 Par-
agraph 34 of the German Criminal Code offers no support for
Hruschka's view that in certain cases the interests of a person who is
the cause of danger to another must take a back seat to the interests of
the person endangered. Defensive necessity, on the other hand, pro-
vides for a different standard of comparison when the interests which
stand to be hurt by the defense are themselves the source of the
danger.
The actor in defensive necessity need not promote the greater
good, she simply cannot cause harm substantially disproportionate to
the value of the interests she protects. Even assuming lives of equal
value, the result is an even trade. Sacrificing his life to save hers does
not cause substantially disproportionate harm, and under this analy-
sis, the battered woman could be justified in killing her tormentor.
Hruschka's critics argue that rules developed for property cannot
simply be applied to people, whose interests must be treated with ut-
most consideration, so long as they are not engaged in wrongful ag-
gression against another.217 Further, the defensive necessity actor is
allowed virtually the full scope of the Paragraph 32 "Necessary De-
fense" despite the non-existence of a "present attack." Hruschka's
justified defensive necessity solution produces the same problematic
consequences in terms of resistance, support and intervention as in
Suppert's preventative defense.
An early theory by Reinhard Maurach of "Tatverantwortung,"
21 8
responsibility for the act, was an attempt to find a more satisfactory
solution to the borderline cases when exceptional circumstances force
the actor's conduct. He introduced another level of accountability
between wrongfulness (Unrecht) and blame (Schuld). This prerequi-
site level of responsibility for the act would have to be met before any
assessment of culpability could be made. A reproach of blame should
be inferred from the individual character of the defendant, not the
pressure of extraordinary circumstances. Maurach's theory applies to
those cases in which there is no justification, but if there is not respon-
sibility for the act, the actor is not merely excused, she is not held
216. Hruschka, Rechtfertigungsgruende, supra note 215.
217. Roxin, Notstand, supra note 202.
218. Maurach & Zipf, supra note 117, § 32, at 411-15.
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accountable. 219
The theory of "Tatverantwortung," while generally rejected with
the reasoning that general grounds of excuse are adequate to relieve
the actor from the unwarranted reproach of blame, 220 shows a certain
dissatisfaction with the sharpness of the distinction between justified
and excused behavior. It has sparked others to search for a middle-
ground solution for cases which do not fit neatly on either side of the
border. Hans-Ludwig Guenther221 has labeled these "notstandsaeh-
nliche Lage" situations similar to necessity. These are cases which fit
the essential description of Paragraph 34 "Justified Necessity," but in
which there can be no actual justification because the legal interest
defended is not "substantially" greater than the legal interest harmed
by the defense. In the "notstandsaehnliche" cases the interest saved
through the defense may be only slightly greater or even slightly less
than the harm caused.
Guenther includes in his analysis cases of conflict of duty, acts
done under duress, preventative necessary defense and overstepping
the social-ethical limits of necessary defense. He would differentiate
between simple wrongfulness (Rechtswidrigkeit) and "criminal"
wrongfulness (Strafrechtswidrigkeit), which is a higher degree of
wrong. The "criminal" wrongfulness of an act is eliminated not only
by a justification ground, but at an even earlier stage of legal analysis
if it lacks the higher degree of wrongfulness.
Applying this theory to battered women's cases, the act of killing
a tyrannical husband could lack "criminal" wrongfulness, although it
is not justified. Participation in a killing which lacks "criminal"
wrongfulness would not be subject to prosecution because the "recht-
swidrig" act in the definition of accessories (Paragraphs 26 and 27
StGB) should be read to require participation in a "criminally"
wrongful act.222 On the other hand the act remains "rechtswidrig" in
the same sense of Paragraph 32 so that the victim has a right to a
necessary defense against it.223
Arthur Kaufmann handles the same group of cases by proposing
a "Rechtsfreieraum," a law free area where the legal order steps back
and declines to regulate the competition of interests, because there is
219. Kaufmann, supra note 212.
220. H. JESCHECK, supra note 36, at 285.
221. H. GUENTHER, STRAFRECHTSWIDRIGKEIT UND STRAFUNRECHTSAUSSCHLUSS
(1983).
222. Id. at 390.
223. Id. at 380.
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no acceptable measure by which to judge.224 In life versus life neces-
sity situations and conflict of duty cases (father can only save one of
two drowning children) Kaufmann proposes the law simply remain
silent. Participation in a non-regulated act would not be punishable.
As for necessary defense or help against a non-regulated act, Kauf-
mann suggests that since there is no way morally or legally to deter-
mine who has the better right, the actor or the defender, the law
would decline to regulate.
225
VI. CONCLUSION
The existing, narrow juristic concepts are simply inadequate to
deal with the enormity of domestic violence against women. The
rules we have developed to divide freedom between private individu-
als involved in physical confrontation (self-defense, necessary defense)
are based on one time encounters between strangers and are inade-
quate to regulate the sphere of action between persons involved in
long-term intimate relationships.2 2 6 The law has failed to adequately
distinguish between instant aggression and the more insidious contin-
uous escalating domestic violence. Should a family or marital bond
bestow greater privileges or place greater restraints on a defender?
Should the one instant in which the victim of long-term violence fi-
nally acts to save her own life be isolated and judged by rules which
would cast her in the role of aggressor? Can we blame a battered
woman for responding to unbearable dangerous circumstances by
killing?
The problems presented in women's self-defense cases are two-
fold. First, women's socialization, experience and perspective have
not been included in the consideration of self-defense requirements.
Consequently, women who defend their lives are at a disadvantage in
persuading an almost exclusively male judiciary of the validity of their
claims. The difficulties are particularly acute when the 'attacker is a
husband. Society accepts a marital relationship in which men are in a
position of power and control, and women in a position of depen-
dence. Each individual defendant deserves to have her claim to self-
defense evaluated free from the sexual biases of the law, society, and
the judiciary.
Self-defense is a hard and cutting right which could have deadly
224. Kaufmann, supra note 212, at 328.
225. Id.
226. Hassemer, Provokation, supra note 154, at 225-44.
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consequences for an attacker. It is important that the prerequisites
for its exercise are clearly laid out and rigorously maintained. The
killing of another should not be justified except in the exceptional
cases where there is an imminent attack and no lesser available means
to save the defender.
It is one thing to maintain a rigorous standard for the exercise of
the self-defense right, and another to arbitrarily remove a class of peo-
ple from the category of justified defenders. In its limitation on the
right to necessary defense for spouses, the German Supreme Court
has failed to consider or appreciate the situation of millions of mar-
ried women who are constantly abused and victimized by their hus-
bands. The prevalence of male violence against women and children
within the family is the reason that the right to necessary defense
should not be limited, but allowed in full measure against attacking
spouses.
The second challenge is to find a just and orderly solution for the
extreme cases of long-term mistreatment where women in a desperate
struggle to survive are driven to kill non-attentive abusers. While it is
contrary to our sense of justice to convict in these cases, it is equally
detrimental to our system of justice to acquit on grounds of self-de-
fense. The illogical consequences of labeling as "justified" a defense
based on a mistaken assessment of the situation or on the desperate
coerced actions of abused family members must be appreciated and
the structure of the law changed to eliminate them.
American law, failing to provide a plausible excuse theory, has
felt the impact of jury acquittals in sleeping husband cases on the in-
stitution of self-defense, where the present attack requirement is re-
peatedly being nullified. In the unlikely event that American law is
indeed ready to embrace a theory of preventative self-defense, then
the adoption should be conscientious and prerequisites, limits and
consequences of the defense systematically analyzed.
A better solution, which the Germans adopted half a century
ago, is for American law to recognize and apply the defense of per-
sonal necessity as an excuse. If the repeated acquittals in battered
women's cases are any indication, then the public appears ready to
show human compassion for its fellow citizens caught up in a mael-
strom of violence and abuse. While we have achieved the same result
in indirect ways, the Germans, by recognizing the excuse of personal
necessity, have a better legal basis for their acquittals of actors who
wrongfully kill another in self-preservation.
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The recognition of a full range of excuses does not change the
normative order of society in the way in which the recognition of jus-
tifications provides exceptions in certain cases to the statutorily pro-
hibited conduct. Excuses merely change the requirements that the
society places upon violators of the legal norms. 227 A humane and
compassionate legal order should be able to take in stride the occa-
sional transgressions of infants, insane and mistaken actors, actors
giving in to the overwhelming pressure of necessity or duress situa-
tions, and those overreacting in attack situations out of fear or
confusion.
The long term solution is for society to recognize the survival
struggles of battered women and send the rescuing ship. Survival kill-
ings will continue until society is prepared to offer women real alter-
natives. Patriarchal notions of power and control over women must
be replaced with new norms of respect and independence for women.
The system that stands prepared to support women's quest for physi-
cal integrity and independence will not need to sort out the legal con-
sequences of its failure to do so.
In the meantime, legal scholars need to continue the arduous
task of hair splitting, making the ever finer distinctions which lead to
just solutions in difficult, borderline cases. In this process, it is clear
we have much to share with our German counterparts.
227. Hassemer, Justification and Excuse, supra note 76, at 597.
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